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Abstract 	  Temporal	  discounting	  refers	  to	  a	  preference	  for	  smaller	  sooner	  rewards	  over	  larger	  delayed	  rewards.	  We	  explored	  temporal	  discounting	  in	  a	  set	  of	  two	  studies	  as	  a	  construct	  of	  rational	  thinking	  in	  emerging	  adults.	  In	  Study	  One,	  we	  examined	  temporal	  discounting	  preferences	  using	  three	  different	  paradigms.	  The	  first	  paradigm	  used	  a	  classic	  staircase	  presentation	  of	  items,	  the	  second	  paradigm	  used	  a	  mixed	  presentation	  of	  items,	  and	  the	  third	  paradigm	  assessed	  response	  consistency	  across	  choices.	  Associations	  with	  individual	  differences	  in	  cognitive	  ability	  and	  thinking	  dispositions	  related	  to	  rational	  thinking	  were	  examined.	  In	  Study	  Two,	  we	  examined	  whether	  providing	  explanations	  to	  wait	  for	  delayed	  rewards	  and	  to	  respond	  consistently	  across	  items	  would	  result	  in	  more	  willingness	  to	  wait	  for	  larger	  delayed	  rewards	  and	  greater	  response	  consistency.	  Willingness	  to	  wait	  for	  larger	  delayed	  rewards	  was	  found	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  higher	  intellectual	  ability	  and	  various	  thinking	  dispositions,	  especially	  during	  choices	  that	  consisted	  of	  high	  rates	  of	  return	  (Study	  One).	  When	  provided	  with	  a	  reason	  to	  choose	  the	  delayed	  reward,	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  individuals	  who	  initially	  chose	  smaller	  sooner	  rewards	  switched	  their	  preferences	  and	  chose	  the	  larger	  delayed	  rewards	  instead	  (Study	  Two).	  Similarly,	  when	  provided	  with	  a	  reason	  to	  choose	  consistently,	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  individuals	  who	  initially	  displayed	  inconsistent	  reward	  preferences	  later	  switched	  preferences	  and	  chose	  consistent	  rewards	  preferences	  instead.	  Our	  results	  suggest	  that	  temporal	  discounting	  preferences	  may	  be	  a	  useful	  index	  of	  rational	  decision-­‐making.	  Broader	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  implications	  of	  our	  results	  are	  discussed.	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Introduction 
 
  Do you prefer $100 now or $150 in one year? This represents a 50% annual rate of return, 
which is an outstanding gain for any investor. However, many individuals will prefer the smaller 
immediate gain to the larger delayed benefits (e.g., Myerson & Green, 1995; Green et al., 1997). 
This preference for smaller sooner rewards over larger delayed rewards is referred to as temporal 
discounting and it is assessed using temporal discounting paradigms. All individuals devalue 
increasingly delayed rewards, but there are considerable individual differences in how rapidly 
people devalue future amounts of money. For example, while some individuals will forsake $150 
in one year for $50 now, others will be willing to wait for $150 reward in one year even if they 
are offered $70 now.  Unusually strong preferences for smaller sooner rewards have been shown 
to be an indicator of impulsive decision-making (Ostaszewski, 1996; Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, 
& Brady, 2003; Zhong & DeVoe, 2010). People who are less willing to wait for larger delayed 
rewards are more likely to display low self-control (Ostaszewski, 1996; Coffey, Gudleski, 
Saladin, & Brady, 2003; Zhong & DeVoe, 2010) and less future oriented thinking (Steinberg, 
Graham, & O’Brien et al., 2009). They are also more likely to display substance abuse 
(Reynolds, 2006; Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999), gambling problems (Holt, Green, & 
Myerson, 2003; Alessi & Petry, 2003), and risky sexual behaviors (Chesson, Leichliter, & Zimet, 
2006). The negative long-term outcomes associated with a greater preference for smaller sooner 
rewards make temporal discounting a potentially useful construct for operationalizing reward 
preferences over time and studying human decision-making.  
  In two studies, we examined temporal discounting as an index of rationality. In Study 
One, we examined temporal discounting choices using three different paradigms and associations 
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with individual differences in intellectual ability and thinking dispositions. In Study Two, we 
examined whether a rational explanation would provoke participants to modify temporal 
discounting decisions. Specifically, in Study One, we examined whether intellectual abilities and 
thinking dispositions would correlate with more willingness to wait for larger delayed rewards 
and response consistency. This was done in order to determine whether more willingness to wait 
for larger rewards and high response consistency could be conceptualized as more rational than 
not waiting for larger delayed rewards and low response consistency.  In Study Two, we 
examined whether compelling people to think more analytically about their temporal discounting 
choices would result in more rational decisions. This was done in order to determine whether 
participants could understand that waiting for larger delayed rewards and high response 
consistency represents rational behavior.       
What Is Temporal Discounting? 
   
  Humans have been shown to undervalue future rewards (Green, Fry & Myerson, 1995; 
Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Green, Myerson & McFadden, 1997). For example, you might decide 
that $100 now is more valuable than $100 in one week. If you are a smoker, you might decide 
that a cigarette now is more valuable than a cigarette in two days. You might also decide that $85 
now is more valuable than $100 in three months (Green, Fry & Myerson, 1995; Green et al., 
1997) or that one cigarette now is more valuable than two cigarettes in two days (Bickel, Odum, 
& Madden, 2007). Discounting the value of future rewards is referred to as temporal discounting 
(Green, Fry & Myerson, 1995; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991; Takahashi, Taiki, 
Hadzibeganovic, Tarik, Cannas, Sergio, Makino et al., 2009)  
  Psychologists and economists have developed a paradigm to evaluate temporal 
discounting. The temporal discounting paradigm typically offers the hypothetical choice 
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between smaller rewards available immediately (e.g., $50 now) and larger rewards available in 
the distant future (e.g., $100 in 3 months). These paradigms have revealed three important 
findings that define temporal discounting.  
  First, temporal discounting paradigms have shown that many people tend to choose 
smaller sooner rewards over larger delayed rewards (Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991; Ainslie & 
Haslam, 1992; Green, Fry & Myerson, 1995; Green et al., 1997). For example, a preference for 
smaller sooner rewards over larger delayed rewards was demonstrated in a notable experiment 
conducted by Green et al., (1997). Participants were provided with a series of hypothetical 
choices that consisted of two options: 1) an immediate monetary reward that ranged from $0 to 
$99 and 2) $100 in three months. On average, participants preferred anywhere between $82 and 
$99 now over $100 in three months. Most participants judged $82 to $99 available now to be 
more valuable than and thus preferable to $100 available in three months.  
 Second, temporal discounting paradigms have shown that the longer a person has to wait 
for a reward the more likely a person will be to settle for smaller sooner rewards (Green et al., 
1997).  In the study described above, Green et al. (1997) also provided participants with the same 
series of choices, but the delayed reward varied from $100 in three months, six months, one year, 
three years, five years, ten years, and 20 years. On average, participants were willing to settle for 
$78 now over $100 in 6 months, $40 now over $100 in 5 years, and $20 now over $100 in 20 
years. Presumably, the longer participants had to wait to receive the $100 reward, the less 
valuable that $100 became. Rewards become less subjectively valuable the longer a person has to 
wait to receive them. 
  Third, temporal discounting paradigms have shown that the effect of time on temporal 
discounting preferences eventually becomes diminished (Ainslie, 1978; Rachlin et al., 1991; 
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Green et al., 1994). When given the choice between $100 now and $110 in seven days, most 
people will prefer $100 now to $110 in seven days. However, when given a choice between $100 
in 30 days and $110 in 37 days, fewer people will prefer $100 in 30 days to $110 in 37 days.  
Most people will reverse preferences and choose to wait for the larger reward. Most people 
would prefer to wait an extra seven days for $10, only if the wait occurs a month into the future 
and not in the immediate present. As such, temporal discounting is best represented by a 
hyperbolic curve (Ainslie & Herrnstein, 1978; Rachlin et al., 1991; Green et al., 1994). 
Traditional models of temporal discounting assumed that people’s reward preferences were 
consistent over time, which would be described by an exponential curve. Reward preferences are 
not consistent over time; humans tend to exhibit less patience in the present while thinking that 
they will be more patient if confronted with today’s choice in the future.  
  To summarize, temporal discounting can be thought of as a decrease in the subjective 
value of a reward as the delay to its receipt increases (Green et al., 1995; Green et al., 1997). 
Temporal discounting is demonstrated in a preference for smaller sooner rewards over larger 
delayed rewards. This preference is best modeled by a hyperbolic function. Temporal discounting 
preferences are measured using temporal discounting paradigms that offer the choice between 
smaller sooner rewards and larger delayed rewards.  
   It has been proposed that choosing smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed 
rewards is a normal, adaptive process (Kagel, Green, & Caraco, 1986; Green, Fry, & Myerson, 
1995). Immediate rewards are certain, but delayed rewards are risky and less certain. Humans 
may have evolved to accept smaller rewards that are certain instead of risking loss by waiting for 
larger rewards that might not be received. If humans have evolved to prefer smaller sooner 
rewards over larger delayed rewards, then waiting for delayed rewards may be a process that 
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goes against a human’s natural or intuitive response. Research has shown that a strong preference 
for smaller sooner rewards is associated with high impulsivity (Ostaszewski, 1996; Coffey, 
Gudleski, Saladin, & Brady, 2003; Zhong & DeVoe, 2010). In contrast, choosing to wait for a 
larger delayed reward may be a hard decision that requires cognitive effort and control.  
Waiting is More Cognitively Effortful than not Waiting 
 
  There is converging evidence to suggest that a preference for a larger delayed reward is 
associated with a) more effortful cognitive processing in neural studies (McClure, Laibson, 
Loewenstein, and Cohen, 2004), b) higher cognitive abilities (Shamosh and Gray, 2008), and c) 
thinking dispositions related to future oriented thinking (Steinberg et al., 2009).  
   Effortful Processing and Neural Studies.  Neuroimaging studies have provided 
evidence to support the association between cognitive control and a greater willingness to wait 
for larger delayed rewards. McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen (2004) examined the 
neural correlates of temporal discounting while participants made choices between smaller sooner 
rewards and larger delayed rewards. When participants decided to choose smaller immediate 
rewards, parts of the limbic system that are associated with the midbrain and known to be rich in 
dopaminergic activity were preferentially activated. The limbic system has appeared to be 
involved in emotional processing (see Morgane, Galler, & Mokler, 2005 for a review) and reward 
processing including motivation (Elliot, Friston, Dolan, 2000). The limbic system has frequently 
been implicated in impulsive behavior and addiction. Accordingly, decisions involving smaller 
sooner rewards may be governed by emotional processes associated with reward seeking and 
expectations of pleasure (Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Kelley & Berridge, 2002; Sharot, Shiner, 
Brown, Fan, & Dolan, 2009). When participants decided to choose larger delayed rewards, parts 
of the prefrontal and parietal cortex were preferentially activated. The prefrontal and parietal 
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cortex has been implicated in planning, deliberative cognition, problem solving including 
numerical operations, and controlled decision-making including prediction of outcomes (Smith & 
Jonides, 1991; Miller & Cohen 2001; Miller, Freedman, & Wallis, 2002; McClure et al., 2004). 
The relatively higher levels of activation in the prefrontal cortex during decisions that involve 
larger delayed rewards suggest that participants are investing more cognitive effort into 
deliberately evaluating their choices.  
  McClure et al., (2004) also demonstrated higher levels of activation in the prefrontal 
cortex during decisions for delayed rewards when temporal discounting items were more 
challenging to calculate (i.e., when the difference between the immediate and delayed reward was 
less than 25%). Brain regions engaged in decision-making would be engaged to a greater degree 
by more difficult decisions. Relative increases in prefrontal activation during more difficult 
choices suggests that participants invest more cognitive effort into making the decision to choose 
the larger delayed reward when that decision is more difficult to make. These findings may 
generalize to other situations in which people must engage in more effortful processing in order 
to make decisions involving larger delayed benefits. For example, it has been shown that the 
prefrontal cortex is more strongly activated when dieters choose healthy food over tasty food 
(Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2005). 
   Intellectual Abilities and Temporal Discounting. In a meta-analysis conducted by 
Shamosh and Gray (2008), higher intellectual ability was significantly related to more 
willingness to wait for larger delayed rewards across numerous studies. These studies 
demonstrate that people who display higher intelligence (i.e., as measured by tests of IQ) are 
significantly more likely to wait for larger delayed rewards (e.g., de Wit, Flory, Acheson, 
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McCloskey, & Manuck, 2007, Shamosh, DeYoung, Greene, et al., 2008; Dohmen, Falk, 
Huffman, & Sunde, 2007).  
Working memory has also been implicated in temporal discounting choice performance 
(Bickel, Yi, Landes et al., 2011), where a preference towards sooner rewards has been associated 
with impaired working memory and low neural activation in brain areas responsible for working 
memory (Shamosh, DeYoung, Green et al., 2008). Working memory is used to maintain active 
representations of goal relevant information, especially when faced with conflicting sources of 
arousal (e.g., Engle et al., 1999). Accordingly, when distractions have been introduced during 
experimental paradigms, people have been shown to be more likely to discount the value of a 
delayed reward and to prefer smaller, sooner rewards (Hinso, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003).  
   Thinking Dispositions and Temporal Discounting. In Norris’s (2004) words: “a person 
with an ability to think critically under certain conditions will do it, only if so disposed”. High 
intellectual ability does not always guarantee that a person will use those abilities when making 
decisions (Stanovich, 2009; Kahneman, 2011). Certain thinking dispositions, or a person’s 
tendency to think in a certain way under certain conditions (Norris, 1994), can impact whether or 
not that person will think critically and flexibly in real world situations (Facione. 1998; Facione, 
Sanchez, Facione et al., 1995). In other words, certain ways of thinking can have an impact on 
whether or not an individual will invest time and effort into thinking hard and critically about a 
given choice.     
  People who decide to wait for larger delayed rewards have been shown to display certain 
thinking dispositions. For example, Steinberg et al. (2009) show that individuals who are more 
willing to wait for larger delayed rewards tend to demonstrate high orientation to the future. In 
other words, people who discount the value of a delayed reward may be less likely to extend 
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their thinking into the future and less likely to evaluate present options according to their future 
implications. Similarly, Basile and Toplak (in preparation) found that participants who showed a 
greater willingness to wait for larger rewards tended to demonstrate greater consideration for 
future consequences. High orientation to the future and more consideration for future 
consequences reflect the disposition to be strategic, which includes the tendencies to envision 
future outcomes, set goals, and implement plans (Perkins et al., 1992).  
  That a preference for larger delayed rewards has been associated with more effortful 
cognition, higher intellectual ability, and more orientation to the future, does not necessarily 
mean that all preferences for smaller sooner rewards are necessarily poor choices. However, 
certain temporal discounting choices may be more beneficial than others.  
Certain Temporal Discounting Choices are Better than Others 
 
 Some temporal discounting decisions may be considered better choices than others. For 
example, if you are given the option to choose between $100 now and $101 in one year, you 
might decide that it is not worth waiting one year for an additional $1, which would only amount 
to a 1% annual return. However, if you are given the option to choose between $100 now and 
$110 tomorrow, you might decide that it is worth waiting one day for an extra $10 which would 
amount to 3650% annual return. Deciding when to wait or not to wait may be characterized as a 
type of instrumental rationality.  
  Among the most important areas of study in cognitive science is how humans come to 
make good judgments and decisions.  Human rationality has been defined as what is true and 
what to do (Stanovich, 2009; 2011). Epistemic rationality is concerned with what is true and 
refers to holding unbiased beliefs that accurately reflect the world. Instrumental rationality is 
concerned with what to do or how to act and refers to adopting appropriate goals and behaving 
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in a way that is conducive to achieving those goals. In other words, instrumental rationality refers 
to how good one is at getting what one wants. In some cases, a preference for smaller sooner 
rewards over larger delayed rewards may reflect a failure in instrumental rationality (Stanovich, 
West, & Toplak, 2011). 
  To make optimal decisions, one should assess the potential gains and costs in making a 
choice (Delgado & Tricomi, 2011). By choosing to pass on the current $1500 reward and to wait 
for the $2000 reward in one year, one would gain an extra $500 a year, which would amount to a 
33% interest rate (compounded annually). A 33% annual interest rate is greater than can be 
earned by holding one’s investments in banks, which currently offer interest rates lower than 2% 
(CIBC, 2014; RBC, 2014). If one wants to adopt the appropriate goal of maximizing gains and 
behave in a way that serves that goal despite immediate desires, it would be more rational in this 
circumstance to wait for the larger reward instead of choosing the more appealing but less 
beneficial sooner smaller reward. In such instances, temporal discounting preferences may be 
conceptualized as a measure of instrumental rationality.  
  Consistent with the idea that temporal discounting preferences may be associated with 
instrumental rationality, willingness to wait for larger delayed rewards has been shown to predict 
more positive long-term outcomes (Shoda & Mischel, 1990; Mischel, Shoa, & Peake, 1988). 
Children’s ability to delay gratification was studied in a classic experiment conducted by 
Mischel, Ebbesen, and Raskoff (1972). In a series of studies, children were offered the choice 
between one marshmallow now and two marshmallows in 15 minutes. Follow-up studies showed 
that children who were able to delay gratification and wait for 2 marshmallows also tended to 
have higher Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores (Shoda & Mischel, 1990), parental ratings of 
competencies including ability to plan, concentrate, and handle stress (Mischel, Shoa, & Peake, 
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1988), and education (Ayduk, Mendoa-Denton, Mischel, et al., 2000). These results suggest that 
having the ability to make rational temporal discounting decisions is associated with better long-
term outcomes related to academic performance, planning, and coping.   
Temporal Discounting Preferences as an Index of Rationality  
 
We propose that a willingness to wait for larger delayed rewards in some cases is 
indicative of instrumental rationality, or the ability to set appropriate goals and to behave in a 
way that is conducive to reaching those goals. There is an abundance of evidence to show that 
more effortful processing, higher intellectual ability, higher orientation to the future, and positive 
long-term outcomes are all associated with more willingness to wait for larger delayed rewards. 
When is it definitely not rational to forsake larger delayed rewards for smaller sooner rewards? 
Current temporal discounting measurement paradigms are on a continuous scale and do 
not differentiate between more and less rational choices. Typical temporal discounting tasks offer 
a hypothetical choice between a smaller sooner reward (e.g., $50 now) and a larger delayed 
reward (e.g., $100 in 1 week). In most studies, these items are presented in a staircase method, 
with immediate rewards in consecutive order from high to low (or low to high) and a larger 
delayed reward that is fixed in magnitude and delay (e.g., Green et al., 1995; Green et al., 1997). 
Performance on these tasks is typically measured in one of three ways: 1) the indifference point 
2) area under the curve and 3) the k-value (see Basile & Toplak, in preparation for a critical 
comparison of these three measurement techniques). These three measurement techniques yield a 
value that represents one’s rate of discounting. For example, the indifference point represents the 
point at which the value of an immediate reward in a staircase temporal discounting task is 
subjectively equivalent in value to the larger delayed reward. A person may be willing to forsake 
$2000 in 1 year for $1900 now, $1800 now, and $1700 now. Their point of indifference is 
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when they switch preferences and prefer $2000 in 1 year to $1600 now. It is implied in their 
pattern of choices that they are roughly indifferent to $2000 in 1 year and $1600 now. The 
indifference point is then converted using mathematical modeling into a discount rate. The area 
under the curve and the k-value are also estimates of the discount rate that are based on 
mathematical models. Discount rates do not provide us with a way to clearly differentiate non-
rational temporal discounting preferences from rational temporal discounting preferences.  
We examined temporal discounting preferences as an index of rational-thinking in three 
ways: 1) annual return rates (Study One), 2) response consistency (Study One), and 3) 
understanding/acceptance (Study Two). These methods are described in further detail below.      
1) Return Rates as an Indicator of Rational Preferences. There is no definite or 
objective distinction between incorrect or correct reward choices during temporal discounting 
tasks. However, in a temporal discounting task, the difference between the smaller sooner 
rewards and the larger delayed rewards are often blatantly high or low if conceptualized in terms 
of percent rate increases and long term financial gain. Consider being offered a choice between 
receiving $600 now or $2000 in one year. Waiting a year for the delayed reward results in a 
233% annual interest rate. On the other hand, choosing to wait one year for a $2000 reward over 
a $1900 reward offered now results in only a 5% annual interest rate. Stated in these terms clearly 
depicts the advantages to waiting for some rewards and not waiting for others. While previous 
studies have relied on mathematical modeling of the discounting function as a measure of 
temporal discounting, we used differences in interest rates to distinguish between varying degrees 
of optimal temporal reward preferences. In doing so, we may be able to separate more rational 
temporal discounting choices from ones that are less rational.   
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We used two different versions of the temporal discounting paradigm in order to examine 
return rates as a potential differentiator between rational and non-rational temporal discounting 
preferences: a) the staircase method and b) a mixed method.  
 In the staircase method, we provided participants with a typical temporal discounting 
task. Temporal discounting items were presented in a fixed order. The smaller sooner reward 
ranged from $0 to $1980. The larger, delayed reward was held constant at $2000 with a constant 
delay of one year. The indifference point was calculated for each participant. The staircase 
method was meant to provide us with a measure of temporal discounting that has been used 
conventionally in the literature (e.g., Green et al., 1995; Green et al., 1997).   
In the mixed method, temporal discounting items were presented in random order. We 
calculated the annual return rates for each of the items. When scoring performance using the 
mixed method, we divided items into one of three categories: low annual return, medium annual 
return, and high annual return. We compared temporal discounting preferences across these three 
levels of return.  
  We also examined associations with intellectual ability and thinking dispositions. 
Following past research (Basile & Toplak, in preparation), we examined whether participants 
who show strong consideration of future consequences would also be more likely to prefer 
smaller sooner rewards in our staircase and mixed methods. There are several thinking 
dispositions that are often examined in the rational-thinking literature that may contribute to 
whether a person will invest cognitive effort into evaluating their temporal discounting choices. 
These dispositions relate to one’s desire to act according to reason (Stanovich, 2008) and to the 
tendency to be open-minded and flexible (Sa, Stanovich, & West, 1997; Stanovich & West, 1997; 
2007), to be cognitively persistent and to enjoy effortful thinking (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; 
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Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984; Nair & Ramnayaran, 2000), and to be resistant to superstitious 
thinking (Stanovich & West, 1997; Stanovich, 2005). We examined whether these thinking 
dispositions would associate with decisions to wait for larger delayed rewards.    
 2) Response Consistency as an indicator of Rational Temporal Discounting 
Preferences. Evaluating the consistency in one’s preference across temporal discounting choices 
is another index we used to assess one’s tendency to behave rationally, irrespective of one’s 
contextual influences. Some people provide two contrasting answers to the same question 
depending on context, namely how the question is worded (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). 
Responding in a way that is consistent with beliefs, in a consistent manner across contexts, is 
suggested to reflect rational thinking. Alternatively, showing variations in choice preferences 
depending upon how those choices are presented is therefore considered less rational. This effect 
has been termed a failure of invariance (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).   
  An interesting and related phenomenon that has been shown to occur in temporal 
discounting studies is a preference reversal. When given the choice between $50 today and $100 
in one week, a person may choose $50 today. However, when given a choice between $50 in one 
week and $100 in two weeks, this same person is likely to switch preferences and prefer the $100 
in two weeks (Greene, 1994). This preference reversal may not be rational because both scenarios 
are equivalent and should be treated equivalently. As previously explained, this pattern of 
responding is best described by hyperbolic discounting, which assumes that preferences are not 
consistent over time. Thus, according to Tversky and Kahnmeman’s (1986) theory, preference 
reversals and hyperbolic discounting represent response inconsistency and are thus not rational. 
Should you decide to take $50 now over $100 in one week, then rationally you should also decide 
that in one week from now you will still take $50 over $100 in two weeks from now. If you 
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decide that you are not willing to wait one week for an extra $50 right now, then you should also 
decide that in one week you would still not be willing to wait one week for an extra $50.  
  In order to study response consistency across temporal discounting items, we used a third 
version of the temporal discounting paradigm, which we referred to as the Invariance task. In the 
Invariance task, we sought to invoke preference reversals. The more people reversed preferences, 
the more their responses were considered to be inconsistent and less rational.  
 3) Understanding/acceptance as an indicator of Rational Temporal Discounting 
Preferences. Another way to examine temporal discounting from a rational thinking perspective 
is to determine whether participants will make better choices after we explain to them why 
waiting for larger delayed rewards is rational. We need to be able to distinguish between 
deviations from optimal performance that result due to a rejection of a particular reasoning axiom 
from those deviations that result from a failure to understand the axiom (Slovic & Tversky, 
1974). Consider the following analogy. A pedestrian is in a rush to get to the mall and thus 
crosses the street when the “do not walk” sign is lit. This pedestrian may be irrational for 
endangering his/her life. A second pedestrian may not be as irrational for endangering his/her life 
if they are from a foreign country and did not know that the “do not walk sign” was a warning 
when he/she crossed the street. However, if we teach both pedestrians that the “do not walk” sign 
is a warning not to be ignored, the pedestrian who still crosses the street may then be considered 
not rational.   
  We evaluated whether explaining to participants: 1) why larger delayed rewards are a 
better choice and 2) why it is rational to respond consistently across temporal discounting items 
will impact response choices. Slovic and Tversky (1974) suggest that ‘‘the deeper the 
understanding of the axiom, the greater the readiness to accept it’’ (pp. 372–373).  
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Accordingly, participants who prefer smaller immediate rewards should alter preferences if they 
were made to better understand, or to consciously consider, the logic of return rates and percent 
increases over time (Stanovich & West, 1999). If evaluating annual interest rates is an effective 
method for determining the normative reward preference, then helping participants to understand 
or to use this axiom should alter participant responding. That is, participants should shift towards 
waiting after receiving an explanation for why waiting is a better choice. Similarly, participants 
who are initially inconsistent in their reward preferences should become more consistent after the 
axiom of consistency is explained.   
  We developed a fourth version of the temporal discounting paradigm in order to study the 
impact that providing a good reason to participants will have on responding. This version was 
referred to as the Understanding/Acceptance task. Benjamin et al., (2006) have shown that 
temporal discounting decreases when people are asked to provide reasons for their responses. 
This suggests reflective reasoning elicits more willingness to wait for larger delayed rewards. In 
the Understanding/Acceptance task, we sought to evaluate whether giving participants good 
reasons to make more rational temporal discounting choices will also have a positive impact on 
temporal discounting performance. If people change their preferences in the normative direction, 
then this would suggest that temporal discounting may be used as a measure of rational thinking 
(Slovic and Tversky, 1974; Stanovich & West, 1999). 
 In Study One, we examined individual differences in relation to performance on Staircase 
and Mixed methods and the Invariance task. This was done in order to determine whether more 
willingness to wait for rewards that yield relatively high annual return and high response 
consistency could be conceptualized as more rational than not waiting for rewards that yield high 
annual return and low response consistency. In Study Two, we examined the 
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Understanding/Acceptance task in order to determine whether participants would understand and 
accept waiting for larger delayed rewards and high response consistency as rational behavior.       
Study One 
 
 The goal of Study One was to operationalize temporal discounting preferences as indices 
of rational thinking. Are people with higher intellectual ability and stronger critical thinking 
dispositions a) more likely to prefer larger delayed rewards especially when the long terms gains 
are relatively high, and b) to show response consistency across temporal discounting items? First, 
we hypothesized that a greater willingness to wait for larger delayed rewards on the Staircase and 
Mixed tasks would be associated with stronger intellectual ability and thinking dispositions that 
have been associated with better rational thinking. Participants who choose to wait on items with 
relatively high annual rates of return are predicted to display higher intellectual ability and 
critical thinking dispositions. Second, we hypothesized that greater response consistency in the 
Invariance task would be associated with higher intellectual ability and stronger critical thinking 
dispositions. Third, we hypothesized that both intellectual ability and critical thinking 
dispositions would predict a) more willingness to wait for larger delayed rewards in the Staircase 
and Mixed tasks and b) higher response consistency in the Invariance task.  
 
Methods   
  Participants. One-hundred sixty-eight undergraduate students (111 females, 67 males) 
from York University participated in this study. The average age was 20.09 (SD= 2.50). Fourteen 
of these participants were of African ethnicity, 14 of Asian, seven of Caribbean, 23 of European, 
44 of South Asian, 16 of Middle Eastern, two of Latin, three of Latin/American, and 45 self 
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identified as Other.  Participants were required to speak English fluently or for a minimum of six 
years. Each volunteer participated in exchange for minimal course credit.  
  Measures. Refer to Appendix A for all of the items included in each of the tasks and 
scales described below.     
	   Temporal Discounting Tasks. 
 
  Staircase Method. This task was based on previous temporal discounting tasks that have 
been studied in the literature (e.g., Raineri & Rachlin, 1993; Green et al., 1997). It was intended 
to measure one’s tendency to prefer smaller sooner rewards to larger delayed rewards. It included 
25 items. Participants were asked to choose between $2000 in 1 year and various smaller 
immediate monetary rewards. The immediate reward started at $1980 and with each subsequent 
trial decreased in increments of $20. Performance was scored in two ways. First, we calculated 
the indifference point for each subject. The indifference point is the point at which a participant is 
thought to be indifferent to whether he/she prefers the smaller sooner reward or the larger delayed 
reward, as both options become equal in subject value. The indifference point, or the amount of 
the immediate reward judged equal in subjective value to the delayed reward, was calculated as 
the average of the last immediate amount preferred over the delayed reward and the next 
immediate amount (e.g., Green et al., 1997). The point of indifference typically serves as an 
anchor. Once participants switch, they rarely switch back to preferring the smaller sooner reward. 
However, seven of our participants switched back and forth between preferring the smaller 
sooner reward and the larger delayed reward in this task. As a reliable estimate of their 
indifference point could not be calculated, these seven participants were excluded from analyses 
that included the indifference point. The mean indifference point was 1541.43 (SD= 417). The 
distribution of scores was not normal but this variable was only used in a correlational 
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analysis, which does not assume normality. Higher points of indifference represent less 
discounting of the $2000 reward.  
  Second, to enable parallel comparisons with the Mixed task, we also scored performance 
based on the number of decisions to wait for the larger delayed rewards. Each time a participant 
chose to wait for a delayed reward, he/she was allocated one point. Not waiting for the delayed 
reward was scored zero. Scores were summed for a composite Staircase score out of 25. The 
mean score was 20.58 with a standard deviation of 4.40. Scores were not normally distributed 
and could not be transformed to normal. However, the skewness (-0.631) and kurtosis (.340) 
values for this task were acceptable. Higher scores indicate a greater willingness to wait for larger 
rewards. 
  Mixed Method. This task was also intended to measure one’s tendency to prefer smaller, 
sooner rewards to larger delayed rewards except the items were presented in a random order 
instead of a descending order. It included 27 items. The items were presented in a fixed, random 
order for all participants.  
  When scoring this task, the 27 items were divided into three groups of nine items. The 
three groups were: 1) Low Return, 2) Medium Return, and 3) High Return based on the annual 
rate of return on these items. Items were categorized into the Low Return group if the delayed 
reward yielded less than a 35% annual return, the Medium Return group if the delayed reward 
yielded between a 90% and a 600% annual return, and High Return if the delayed reward yielded 
between a 1400% and a 9100% annual return. While these rates of return are systematically 
higher than the current interest rates, the purpose of these groupings in the current study was to 
contrast considerably different levels for comparison. Each time a participant chose to wait for 
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the larger reward, he/she was allocated one point. Not waiting for the larger reward was scored 
zero. Scores were summed in each of the three groups yielding three separate total scores.  
   The scores for the Low Return category (M=5.18, SD=2.63), the Medium Return 
category (M=6.25, SD=3.07), and the High Return category (M=8.19, SD= 2.22) were not 
normally distributed and the data could not be transformed to a normal distribution. However, the 
skewness (0.57) and kurtosis (-.95) values for the Medium Return were acceptable. The High 
Return total scores were skewed (-1.62) with a greater number of high scores, which was 
expected since higher return rates should provoke greater waiting. Scores for the Low Interest 
Rates were skewed (1.897) with a greater number of low scores, which was also expected since 
lower return rates should provoke less waiting. Higher scores indicate a greater willingness to 
wait for larger rewards. The data could not be transformed to normal.  
Invariance Task. We developed a temporal discounting task intended to measure whether 
participants would select consistent discounting choices with the same delay and reward 
magnitudes within each choice. This task included a total of 13 items and each item consisted of 
two-paired questions. In one pair, participants were asked to choose between a specific smaller 
reward offered today or a larger reward offered weeks or months later. In the other pair, 
participants were asked to choose between a specific smaller reward offered weeks or months 
from today, and a larger delayed reward offered even later. The two pairs complimented each 
other so that each item in one group was matched to one of the items in the second group in 
equivalent wait times, immediate reward values, and delayed reward values; the only difference 
was that for the second group of items, participants were required to wait for both smaller and 
larger rewards. The following is a sample item:  
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1. If you had a choice, would you prefer $180 now OR $200 in 2 weeks? 
  
1. Very strongly prefer $180 now  
2. Strongly prefer $180 now  
3. Prefer $180 now  
4. Prefer $200 in 2 weeks  
5. Strongly prefer $200 in 2 weeks  
6. Very strongly prefer $200 in 2 weeks  
 
2. If you had a choice, would you prefer $180 in 10 weeks OR $200 in 12 weeks? 
  
1. Very strongly prefer $180 in 10 weeks  
2. Strongly prefer $180 in 10 weeks  
3. Prefer $180 in 10 weeks  
4. Prefer $200 in 12 weeks  
5. Strongly prefer $200 in 12 weeks  
6. Very strongly prefer $200 in 12 weeks  
 
   Participants who chose the same reward preference for both items (i.e., “very strongly 
prefer”, “strongly prefer” or “prefer” $180 for both items or “very strongly prefer”, “strongly 
prefer” or “prefer” $200 for both items) were scored as invariant or consistent and were allocated 
one point. Participants who chose two different reward preferences for both items were scored as 
variant or inconsistent performance and were allocated zero points. Scores were summed for a 
total score of performance out of 13. Scores were not normally distributed (M= 8.19, SD= 2.11). 
However, the skewness value was acceptable (0.41). Higher scores represented less invariance 
and greater response consistency. This variable was referred to as the Invariance Score.  
 We also evaluated performance on this task as a typical measure of temporal discounting 
irrespective of response consistency. First, we split the items in the Invariance task into two 
groups. Group one included the 13 items that had smaller rewards available now and was referred 
to as the Now, Later group. Group two included the 13 items that consisted of smaller rewards 
with a delay and was referred to as the Later, Even Later group. In each group, preferences for 
smaller sooner rewards were scored zero and preferences for larger delayed rewards were 
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scored one. Scores in each group were summed for a composite temporal discounting score. This 
was done in order to ensure that Invariance task items elicited similar degree of temporal 
discounting as our Staircase and Mixed items. The mean temporal discounting score for group 1 
(now, later) was 5.55 with a standard deviation of 3.61. This variable was referred to as the 
Group One: TD score. The mean temporal discounting score for group 2 (later, even later) was 
6.3 with a standard deviation of 3.61. This variable was referred to as the Group 2: TD score. 
Higher scores represented more willingness to wait for larger, delayed rewards.  
 Intellectual ability. Participants completed an 18-item version of Raven’s Advanced 
Progressive Matrices (Set II, Raven 1962) and a 60-item Vocabulary measure that uses a 
checklist-with foils format. The Matrix reasoning items were used to measure nonverbal ability 
and analytic thinking (Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990). The inter-item correlations showed 
sufficient reliability of test scores in this subtest (Cronbach’s alpha =.70). Participants also 
completed a Vocabulary subtest that included 40 words and 20 non-words used to measure 
individual differences in vocabulary knowledge (Anderson & Freebody, 1983). These items have 
been considered to be a strong measure of verbal ability (Cooksey & Freebody, 1987; 
Zimmerman, Broder, Shaughnessy, & Underwood, 1977). The inter-item correlations showed 
sufficient reliability of test scores in the verbal ability subtest (Cronbach’s alpha =.78).  
  Raven’s Matrices and the Vocabulary test items combined have been thought to provide a 
strong index of general intellectual ability and fluid intelligence (Toplak et al., 2011; Toplak & 
Stanovich, 2002). Furthermore, other studies have shown that Raven’s Matrices tests are 
especially strongly correlated with full-scale intelligence scores (FSIQ) of the Wechsler 
intelligence tests (Watson & Klett, 1974; Wechsler, 2002).       
  Verbal reasoning scores had a mean of 18.0 and a standard deviation of 8.2.  Non-
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verbal reasoning scores had a mean of 5.2 and a standard deviation of 3.1. Verbal and non-verbal 
reasoning scores were standardized (z-scores) and summed for a composite score of intellectual 
ability. Higher z-scores represent higher intellectual ability.  
  Thinking Dispositions Questionnaire. Participants completed a self-report questionnaire 
that included five intermixed scales to measure thinking dispositions that have been associated 
with rational thinking and good decision-making (Perkins, Jay and Tishman,1992; Nair & 
Ramnayaran, 2000; Stanovich, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2007; Stanovich, 2008). Participants 
were asked to rate their agreement with each question using the following six-point scale: 
Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree Moderately (2), Disagree Slightly (3), Agree Slightly (4), Agree 
Moderately (5), Strongly Agree (6). Questions were presented in mixed order so that the target 
scales of interest would be less transparent to participants. The following thinking disposition 
scales were included:  
  Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT). This 41-item scale developed by Stanovich and 
West (2007) is intended to measure tendency toward open-minded thinking (Sa, Stanovich, & 
West, 1997; Stanovich & West, 1997; 2007). Sample items were, “People should always take 
into consideration evidence that goes against their beliefs” and, “Changing your mind is a sign of 
weakness” (reverse scored). Scores were summed for a total score of AOT. The total scores were 
normally distributed with a mean of 2.20 and a standard deviation of 0.05. The inter-item 
correlations showed sufficient reliability of test scores with a Cronbach’s alpha of .82 and split-
half reliability of .81. Higher scores represented higher tendency towards actively open-minded 
thinking. 
  Master Rationality Motive (MRM). This 13-item scale is intended to measure the degree 
to which an individual desires to make decisions that are based on reason (Stanovich, 2008). 
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Sample items were, “I like to have reasons for what I do”, and “I like to gather many different 
types of evidence before I decide what to do”. Scores were summed for a total MRM score. 
Scores were normally distributed with a mean of 52.35 and standard deviation of 8.11. The inter-
item correlations showed sufficient reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of  .77 and split-half 
reliability of .76. Higher scores represented a greater desire to make decisions based on reason. 
Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC). This 12-item scale assesses the extent to 
which one considers distant outcomes when choosing one’s present behavior (Strathman, 
Gleicher, Boninger & Edwards, 1994). A sample item was, “I only act to satisfy immediate 
concerns, figuring the future will take care of itself” (reverse scored). Scores were summed to 
create a total score of CFC. The total scores were normally distributed (M=46.36, SD=6.60). In 
the current study, inter-item correlations show sufficient reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.66 and split-half reliability of 0.75.  Higher scores represented a higher consideration of future 
consequences. 
  Need for Cognition Scale (NFC). This 18-item scale, originally developed by Cacioppo et 
al. (1996) is intended to assess one’s tendency toward engaging in and enjoying effortful 
thinking. Sample items were:  “I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions 
to problems”, and “It is enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why 
it works” (reverse coded). Scores were summed for a total score of NFC. Scores were normally 
distributed (M=65.28, SD=10.25). A previous study reported a split-half reliability of .81 for this 
scale and a Cronbach’s alpha of .88 (West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008). The inter-item 
correlations among scores in the present study showed sufficient reliability with a Cronbach’s 
alpha of  .79 and split half reliability of .77. Higher scores represented a higher need for 
cognition. 
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Superstitious Thinking (ST). This 13-item scale was composed of two items from a 
paranormal scale used by Jones, Russell and Nickel (1977), four items from a luck scale used by 
Stanovich and West (1998c), four items from an ESP scale used by Stanovich (1989), and three 
items from a superstitious thinking scale published by Epstein and Meier (1989).  Sample items 
include: “Astrology can be useful in making personality judgments,” “The number 13 is 
unlucky,” and “I do not believe in any superstitions” (reverse scored).  The score on the scale was 
obtained by summing the responses to the 13 items. The mean score was 35.52 and the standard 
deviation was 10.17. The inter-item correlations show sufficient reliability with a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .81 and split-half reliability of .78. Higher scores represented higher superstitious 
thinking. 
Thinking Dispositions Composite. The thinking disposition scales were all significantly 
inter-correlated with Pearson values ranging from 0.27 to 0.59 (p< 0.001). Total scores for each 
of the thinking disposition scales were transformed into z-scores. The z-scores for AOT, NFC, 
MRM, and CFC were summed. The z-scores for ST were subtracted from this sum in order to 
yield a total composite score that reflects dispositional tendencies towards actively open-minded 
thinking, persistence in thinking, desire to act according to rational motives, consideration of 
future consequences, and superstitious thinking.  
  Procedure. Questionnaires were distributed and data was collected using Qualtrics, an 
online survey site. The Questionnaire took approximately 1.5 hours to complete. The 
questionnaire was organized such that a participant could not proceed to the next item before 
submitting a response to the current one. Once submitted, a response could not be changed.   
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Results  
	  	   Temporal Discounting Task Frequencies.  
 
Staircase and Mixed Methods. Table 1 includes a frequency distribution of the number of 
later choosers for each item on the Staircase and the Mixed tasks. The annual rate of return for 
each item is also indicated in Table 1. From the pattern of frequencies in Table 1, it is clear that 
as the annual rate of return increased with each subsequent item presented in the Staircase and 
Mixed task, the number of participants who chose the larger delayed reward also generally 
increased. However, the number of participants who decided to wait for the larger delayed 
rewards for a particular level of return tended to be larger in the Staircase task than in the Mixed 
task. For example, 99 participants chose the delayed reward when it yielded 33 percent return in 
the TD Staircase, but only 38 people chose the delayed reward when it yielded 36 percent return 
in the TD Mixed task. From the perspective of annual rate of return, considerably fewer 
participants chose to wait for the delayed option in the Mixed than in the Staircase task. The 
frequencies of total scores for the TD Staircase (M= 20.58, SD= 4.40) and TD Mixed Low 
(M=5.18, SD=2.63), TD Mixed Medium (M=6.25, SD=3.07), and TD Mixed High  (M=8.19, 
SD= 2.22) tasks are displayed in Appendix B. 
Table 1.  
Annual Return Rates Yielded by Choosing the Delayed Reward for each Item in the Staircase and 
Mixed Task, and the Number of People who chose to wait for the Delayed Reward.   
Item Return Rate (%) Later Choosers (n/168) 
TD Staircase Task   
$1,990 now or 2000 in 1 year    0.6 17 
$1,980 now or 2000 in 1 year  1.0 16 
$1,950 now or 2000 in 1 year  2.6 27 
$1,900 now or 2000 in 1 year  5.3 37 
$1,850 now or 2000 in 1 year  8.1 50 
$1,800 now or 2000 in 1 year  11.1 57 
$1,700 now or 2000 in 1 year  17.7 79 
$1,600 now or 2000 in 1 year  25.0 90 
	  26	  
$1,500 now or 2000 in 1 year  33.3 99 
$1,400 now or 2000 in 1 year  42.9 114 
$1,300 now or 2000 in 1 year  53.9 119 
$1,200 now or 2000 in 1 year  66.7 127 
$1,000 now or 2000 in 1 year  100.0 137 
$900 now or 2000 in 1 year  122.2 159 
$800 now or 2000 in 1 year  150.0 159 
$700 now or 2000 in 1 year  185.7 158 
$600 now or 2000 in 1 year  233.3 161 
$500 now or 2000 in 1 year  300.0 160 
$400 now or 2000 in 1 year  400.0 162 
$300 now or 2000 in 1 year  566.7 162 
$200 now or 2000 in 1 year  900.0 164 
$150 now or 2000 in 1 year  1233.3 164 
$100 now or 2000 in 1 year  1900.0 163 
$50 now or 2000 in 1 year  3900.0 164 
$20 now or 2000 in 1 year  9900.0 165 
TD Mixed: Low Return Rate   
$34 now or $35 in 186 days 5.8 22 
$54 now or $55 in 117 days 5.8 15 
$75 now or $80 in 162 days 5.8 29 
$80 now or $85 in 157 days 14.5 25 
$47 now or $50 in 160 days 14.6 26 
$28 now or $30 in 179 days 14.6 26 
$67 now or $75 in 119 days 36.6 38 
$54 now or $60 in 111 days 36.5 28 
$22 now or $25 in 136 days 36.6 21 
TD Mixed: Med Interest Rate   
$69 now or $85 in 91 days 93.0 64 
$49 now or $60 in 89 days 92.1 50 
$25 now or $30 in 80 days 91.3 34 
$55 now or $75 in 61 days 217.5 66 
$19 now or $25 in 53 days 217.6 46 
$40 now or $55 in 62 days 220.7 45 
$24 now or $35 in 29 days 576.9 66 
$34 now or $50 in 30 days 572.6 96 
$54 now or $80 in 30 days 585.8 119 
TD Mixed: High Interest Rate   
$14 now or $25 in 19 days 1509.4 109 
$27 now or $50 in 21 days 1480.6 123 
$41 now or $75 in 20 days 1513.4 132 
$25 now or $60 in 14 days 3650.0 135 
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$15 now or $35 in 13 days 3743.6 143 
$33 now or $88 in 14 days 3713.2 143 
$31 now or $85 in 7 days 9058.1 147 
$11 now or $30 in 7 days 9006.5 152 
$20 now or $55 in 7 days 9125.0 157 
 
  Invariance Methods. Table 2 includes the frequency of later choosers on each item and of 
invariant responders on each pair of items in the TD Invariance task. Participants could have 
shown two types of response invariance on this task. First, participants could have shown 
invariance by choosing the smaller sooner rewards in both pairs of matched items. Second, 
participants could have shown invariance by choosing the larger delayed rewards in both pairs of 
matched items. The number of participants who showed invariance on each pair of items ranged 
from 72 to 137. Note that for some of these items, many participants showed invariance by 
selecting the smaller sooner rewards for both pairs of items. For example, for the first pair of 
items 61 out of 72 invariant responders chose the delayed rewards while 11 out of 72 invariant 
responders chose the smaller sooner rewards. For the second pair of items, 40 out of 130 
invariant responders chose the larger delayed rewards while 90 out of 130 invariant responders 
chose the smaller sooner rewards.  
  Participants could have shown two types of response variance for each pair of items in 
this task. First, participants could have shown response variance by choosing the smaller sooner 
reward in the first item and then the larger delayed reward for the second item. This pattern of 
responding would have been a preference reversal in the expected direction (Green, 1994). 
Fourth, participants could have shown variance by choosing the larger delayed reward in the first 
item and then the smaller sooner reward for the second item, which would have been a preference 
reversal in the unexpected direction. Contrary to prior research, fewer participants than expected 
	  28	  
displayed preference reversals on each pair of items. For example, 72 participants answered 
consistently on our first pair of items, meaning only 57% of our participants showed response 
inconsistency on this pair of items. For a second example, 130 participants answered consistently 
on our second pair of items, meaning only 23% of our participants showed response 
inconsistency on this pair of items.  
   Additionally, of the preference reversals displayed by participants, some were in the 
unexpected direction. For example, in the first pair of items, participants were offered the choice 
between $340 now and $400 in 4 months. Of our participants, 112 chose to wait for the $400 
reward. We later offered the choice between $340 in 10 months and $400 in 14 months. Of our 
participants, 61 people chose to wait for the larger delayed rewards. This means that 51 people 
switched preferences in the unexpected direction. This number was lower, ranging from 0 – 13, 
for the other pair of items. We would expect participants to choose the smaller reward when it is 
offered now, and to switch preferences to preferring the larger delayed rewards when a delay is 
added to the smaller reward (Green, 1994).  
 
Table 2.  
Number of Participants who Chose the Later Reward and number of Invariant Responders in the 
Invariance Task.    
Matched-Pairs  
Number of Later 
Choosers /168 
Number of Invariant 
Responders /168 
$340 now or $400 in 4 months 112 72 
$340 in 10 months or $400 in 14 months 61  
   
$110 now or $120 in 4 weeks 42 130 
$110 in 8 weeks or $120 in 12 weeks 40  
   
$65 now or $70 in 3 weeks 37 124 
$65 in 20 weeks or $70 in 23 weeks 53  
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$60 now or $90 in 3 months  95 110 
$60 in 10 months or $90 in 13 months 105  
   
$300 now or $315 in 1 week 127 133 
$300 in 20 weeks or $315 in 21 week 116  
   
$150 now or $160 in 4 weeks 31 137 
$150 in 20 weeks or $160 in 24 weeks 46  
   
$180 now or $200 in 2 weeks 117 126 
$180 in 10 weeks or $200 in 12 weeks 104  
   
$95 now or $105 in 2 weeks 82 113 
$95 in 10 weeks or $105 in 12 weeks 98  
   
$75 now or $80 in 1 week 99 124 
$75 in 10 weeks or $80 in 11 weeks 109  
   
$70 now or $110 in 6 months 85 121 
$70 in 12 months or $110 in 16 months 116  
   
$235 now or $270 in 4 months 79 90 
$235 in 12 months or $270 in 16 months 66  
   
$45 now or $50 in 4 weeks 34 139 
$45 in 10 weeks or $50 in 14 weeks 39  
   
$210 now or $220 in 3 weeks 43 123 
$210 in 20 weeks or $220 in 23 weeks 56  
 
  Table 3 includes the frequency of total invariance scores in the Invariance task. Higher 
scores represent greater response consistency. Many participants showed relatively high response 
consistency. Less than 25% percent of our participants scored lower than 50% consistency across 
items on this task. More than 45% of our participants scored higher than 80% consistency across 
items on this task. 
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Table 3.  
The Number of Times and Proportion of Participants Who Answered Consistently to Two 
Different, but Equivalent, Temporal Discounting Items   
 
 
Score n Percentage of N (%) 
13 0 0 
12 9 5.4 
11 13 7.7 
10 27 16.1 
9 27 16.1 
8 29 17.3 
7 28 16.7 
6 19 11.3 
5 10 6.0 
4 3 1.8 
                 3 2 1.2 
2 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 1 .6 
Note: A lower score represents less consistency and greater variance, while a higher scores 
represents greater consistency and less variance 
 
  Temporal Discounting Task Inter-correlations. Table 4 includes the Pearson 
correlations among the three temporal discounting tasks. Choices on the Staircase task were 
significantly associated with choices on the Mixed task, particularly for the medium and high 
levels of annual return. Choices on the Staircase task were also significantly associated with a 
preference for larger delayed rewards (i.e., the temporal discounting scores) on all items in the 
Invariance task, but not on the index of response consistency (i.e., the invariance scores) in the 
Invariance task. Choices on the Mixed task were significantly associated with more willingness 
to wait for larger delayed rewards (i.e., temporal discounting scores) on all items in the 
Invariance task. However, choices on the Mixed task were not associated with the index of 
response consistency (i.e., invariance scores) in the Invariance task. Temporal discounting 
preferences in the TD Invariance task were significantly related to TD Invariance scores, which 
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represent response consistency, only when the items consisted of smaller rewards with a delay 
(i.e., Group 2: Later, Even Later). 
Table 4 
Pearson Correlations Among the Staircase, Mixed, and Invariance Tasks.  
 
Temporal Discounting Tasks 1a 1b  2a 2b  2c  2d  3a 3b 3c 
1. Staircase Version          
a. Indifference Score ----         
b. Total Score 
 
.95** ----        
2. Mixed Version          
a. Total Score .57** .59** ----       
b. Low Return .29** .28** .77** ----      
c. Medium Return .57** .59** .93** .66* ----     
d. High Return  .49** .50** .59** .03 
 
.43** ----    
          
3. Invariance Task          
a. Group 1 (now, later): Total 
b. Group 2 (later, even later): Total 
.39** 
.38** 
.42** 
.42** 
.45** 
.45** 
.25** 
.30** 
.48** 
.46** 
.29** 
.27** 
---- 
.77** 
 
---- 
 
c. Invariance Score -.002 .30 .02 .05 .07 .00 .08 .16* ---- 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 Inter-correlations between Temporal Discounting Tasks and Individual Differences 
in Intellectual Abilities and Thinking Dispositions. Table 5 includes the Pearson correlations 
among performance on the temporal discounting tasks, intellectual ability measures, and 
individual thinking disposition scales. Choices on the Staircase task were significantly associated 
with all of the thinking dispositions and with intellectual ability, except the indifference point 
was not significantly related to intellectual ability (r=0.15, p=.058). In other words, participants 
who showed greater preferences for larger delayed rewards were more likely to display high 
intellectual ability, Need for Cognition, Actively Open Minded Thinking, Master Rationality 
Motive, and Consideration for Future Consequences, and lower Superstitious Thinking.  
Intellectual ability and thinking dispositions were not significantly related to total 
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performance on the Mixed task when items were presented in random order. Choices on the 
Mixed Task were associated with intellectual ability and all of the thinking dispositions (except 
for Superstitious Thinking) only when the temporal discounting items consisted of high annual 
return rates. Choices on the Mixed task were not significantly correlated with intellectual ability 
or thinking dispositions when items consisted of low or medium return rates.  
 Response consistency on the Invariance task was not significantly associated with 
intellectual ability or critical thinking dispositions. A preference for larger delayed rewards on the 
Invariance task, irrespective of response consistency, was significantly correlated with 
intellectual ability, AOT, and CFC in both groups of items, but only group two scores (i.e., later, 
even later items) correlated with the thinking disposition composite. Response consistency as 
measured by performance on the Invariance task was not significantly correlated with any of the 
individual differences measures. Intellectual ability and thinking dispositions were related to 
response consistency when participants consistently chose later rewards for both pairs of matched 
items (r= .238, p < .01; r= .211, p< .01 respectively). This relationship was stronger than the 
association between intellectual ability and a preference for later rewards irrespective of response 
consistency (r= .221, p< .01; r=.208, p< .01).  
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Table 5.  
Correlations between Performance on the Temporal Discounting tasks, Thinking Disposition 
Scales, the Thinking Disposition Composite, and Intellectual Ability Measure.  
 
Temporal Discounting 
Tasks 
 Intellectual 
ability 
NFC AOT CFC MRM ST Thinking 
Disposition 
Composite 
Staircase Task         
a. Indifference score  .15 .19* .25** .19* .20* -.30** .31** 
b. Total Score 
 
 .17* .19* .22** .19* .18* -.30** .29** 
Mixed Task         
a. Total Score  .09 .07 .13 .09 .08 -.12 .13 
b. Low Return   -.08 -.01 -.08 -.07 -.13 .08 .10 
c. Medium Return  .04 .05 .07 .06 .03 -.10 .08 
d. High Return    .30** .16* .37** .25** .31** -.29 .37** 
Invariance Task 
b. Group 1: TD Score 
c. Group 2: TD Score 
a. Invariance Score 
  
.18* 
.21** 
.07 
 
.027 
.08 
.04 
 
.16* 
.25** 
.05 
 
.16* 
.20** 
.02 
 
.04 
.12 
.05 
 
-.14 
-.17 
-.08 
 
.14 
.22** 
.01 
  Intellectual 
Ability 
NFC AOT CFC MRM ST Thinking 
Disposition 
Composite 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
  Predicting the Preference to Wait for Larger Rewards. The next set of analyses were 
concerned with determining whether intellectual ability and thinking dispositions would predict 
the willingness to wait for larger, delayed rewards.  Intellectual ability was significantly 
associated with all of the thinking dispositions. The thinking disposition scores were moderately 
to strongly associated with each other. (Refer to Table 3 in the appendix for correlation and 
significance values). Given that intellectual ability and thinking dispositions were significantly 
correlated, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to determine whether thinking 
dispositions would uniquely explain significantly more of the variance in temporal discounting 
choices than intellectual abilities alone. Two hierarchical regressions were conducted: first with 
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the Staircase task as an outcome variable and second with the Mixed: High Return as an outcome 
variable. Since intellectual abilities and thinking dispositions were not significantly related to a 
preference for larger delayed rewards in the Mixed task for Low and Medium levels of annual 
return or response consistency in the Invariance task, the regression analysis were not conducted 
for either of these tasks.  
  Results of the variance inflation factor (all less than 2.0), and collinearity tolerance (all 
greater than .76) suggest that intellectual ability and the thinking disposition composite are not 
collinear and that the estimated βs are well established in all of the following hierarchical 
regression analyses. An examination into outliers reveals one case with an extremely low score 
for the first regression analysis, and three cases with extremely high scores for the second. 
However, no justification could be found for the elimination of these outliers, and thus the cases 
were retained. Results of the hierarchical regression analyses are displayed in Table 6 below.  
Table 6.  
Regression Results.    
 
 R2 Δ R2 (N) ΔF Unique 
Variance 
Standardized 
β 
Criterion Variable = Staircase Task 
1. Intellectual ability Block: Composite 
2. Thinking Disposition Block: Composite 
 
 
.03 
.08 
 
.03* 
.06** 
 
5.67* 
9.82** 
 
.0015 
.055 
 
.04 
.26***  
 
Criterion Variable = Mixed High Annual Return 
1. Intellectual ability Block: Composite 
2. Thinking Disposition Block: Composite 
 
 
.09 
.16 
 
.09*** 
.07*** 
 
16.80*** 
12.85*** 
 
.023 
.066 
 
.17* 
.29*** 
***, P <.001;  **. P <.01; *. P <.05 
 
 
The first analysis included performance on the Staircase task as an outcome measure with 
intellectual ability entered into the first block and thinking dispositions entered into the second. 
The general model was significant (R2=0.08, F(1, 164)=7.37, p= 0.001). Thinking dispositions 
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was a significant predictor of Staircase performance (β = 0.32, p< .01).  Intellectual ability was 
found to significantly predict a preference for larger delayed reward in the Staircase task when it 
was entered into the first model alone (β=.45, p< .05) but it was no longer a significant 
contributor (β =.118, p=.603) when thinking dispositions was added to the model. Results of 
block one indicated that intellectual ability accounted for 2.8% of the performance on the 
Staircase task, which was significantly different from zero (F(1, 165)=5.67, p<.05). The results of 
block two indicated that thinking dispositions accounted for an additional 5.5% of the variance in 
Staircase, which was a significant change from block one (F(1, 164)=9.82, p<.001). According to 
this analysis, thinking dispositions accounted for 5.5% of the unique variance in Staircase 
performance. Thus, a general disposition towards thinking critically uniquely predicted 5.5% of 
the variability in a preference for larger delayed rewards.  
   The second analysis included the Mixed task with High levels of annual return as an 
outcome measure with intellectual ability entered into the first block and the thinking dispositions 
composite entered into the second block. The general model was significant (R2=0.40, F(1, 
164)=15.42, p= <0.001). Intellectual ability was a significant predictor of performance on the 
Mixed task for High levels of annual return (β =.232, p< 0.05), as was the thinking dispositions 
composite (β =.176, p< 0.001). The results of block one indicated that intellectual ability 
accounted for 9.2% of the performance on the Mixed task for High levels of annual return, which 
was significantly different from zero (F(1, 165)=16.80, p<.001). The results of block 2 indicated that 
thinking dispositions accounted for an additional 6.6% of the unique variance in the Mixed task 
for High levels of annual return, which was a significant change from block one (F(1, 164)=12.85, 
p<.001). According to this analysis, thinking dispositions accounted for 6.6% of the unique 
variance in performance on the Mixed task for High levels of annual return.  
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Study Two 
 
  Results of Study One have indicated that preferences for larger delayed rewards are 
associated with high intellectual ability and critical thinking dispositions, especially with higher 
annual rates of return. Results of Study One have also indicated that response consistency in 
temporal discounting choices is not necessarily associated with high intellectual ability or critical 
thinking dispositions. Would people be more likely to make better choices if it is explained to 
them why waiting for larger delayed rewards and responding consistently across temporal 
discounting choices reflects more rational decision-making? In Study Two, we examined whether 
people would shift their immediate choice to a later choice after being given an explanation for 
why waiting would be beneficial. We also examined whether fewer people would show 
preference reversals after being given an explanation to respond consistently across temporal 
discounting choices. This method was used as a further converging method to assess temporal 
discounting as an indicator of rational choice (Stanovich & West, 1999).  
  First, we hypothesized that giving participants a good explanation to choose the larger 
delayed reward would impact their initial responses. Second, we hypothesized that giving 
participants a good explanation to respond consistently would also impact their initial responses. 
If people change their preferences in the normative direction, then this would suggest that using 
return rates as a rational to make good temporal discounting preferences is an axiom that is 
understood and accepted. It also suggests that our Understanding/Acceptance paradigm may be 
an effective measure of rational thinking (Slovic and Tversky, 1974; Stanovich & West, 1999).   
Methods 
Participants. Participants who completed the tasks in Study One also participated in 
Study Two. Each volunteer participated in exchange for minimal course credit.  
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Measures. 
  Understanding/Acceptance-Reason To Wait Task. This task was adapted and 
based on methods used by Slovic and Tversky (1974) and Stanovich and West (1999). It was 
used to measure whether evaluating temporal discounting choices according to yearly percent 
rate increases was an axiom that was commonly accepted. The Understanding/Acceptance-
Reason To Wait Task was comprised of two items, and each item included two parts.  
  Item 1. In the first part, participants were asked to choose between a specific, smaller 
award that was available immediately and a larger, delayed reward that would have available at a 
later time. The normative response would be to select the larger delayed reward. This part 
appeared as follows:  
 “If you had a choice, would you prefer $75 now OR $80 in 1 week?” 
1. Very strongly prefer $75 now 
2. Strongly prefer $75 now 
3. Prefer $75 now 
4. Prefer $80 in 1 week 
5. Strongly prefer $80 in 1 week 
6. Very strongly prefer $80 in 1 week 
 
At a later point in time during the study, the second part of Item One was presented to 
participants. The normative response would be to select the larger delayed reward. This part 
appeared as follows: 
 
“Let’s consider the choice between $75 now VERSUS $80 in 1 week. 
  
There would be a good reason to wait 1 week for $80 instead of taking $75 right now. 
Waiting for an extra $5 is getting a 7% return for just waiting 1 week. This would amount 
to a 347% return based on an annual interest rate. This is an extraordinarily higher return 
than most banks or investment firms would give you. They would give you less than a 5% 
annual interest rate.   
  
Based on this information, what would you prefer?”   
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1. Very strongly prefer $75 now 
2. Strongly prefer $75 now 
3. Prefer $75 now 
4. Prefer $80 in 1 week 
5. Strongly prefer $80 in 1 week 
6. Very strongly prefer $80 in 1 week 
 
  Participants who preferred any of the  “$75 now” options were considered “Now 
Choosers”, while those who preferred any of the “$80 in 1 week” options were considered “Later 
Choosers”. Participants within each group were further divided into one of two groups based on 
their choices for the second part: Switchers and Non-Switchers. Switchers were those who had 
changed their reward preferences when they were provided with a reason to choose $80 in 1 
week over $75 now. Refer to Figure 1 for an illustration of the resulting categories.  
 
  Part 1  
 
Part 2 
 $75 Now  Wait for $80  
$75 Now  Non-Switcher Switcher  
(non-normative) 
 
Wait for $80 Switcher  
(normative) 
Non-Switcher  
 
Figure 1. Between-Subject grouping categories for Item One in the Understanding/Acceptance: 
Reason to wait task.   
 
   Given that our scale provided participants with the opportunity to rate their preferences 
from 1-3, those who had preferred smaller, immediate rewards were not considered switchers 
unless they had changed their answers from preferring, strongly preferring, or very strongly 
preferring $75 now, to preferring, strongly preferring, or very strongly preferring $80 in 1 
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week. The same criterion applied to those who preferred larger, delayed rewards; switchers were 
those who changed their reward preferences from preferring, strongly preferring, or very strongly 
preferring $80 in 1 week, to preferring, strongly preferring, or very strongly preferring $75 now. 
A switch in the normative direction referred to switches from preferring the $75 now to 
preferring the $80 later. A switch in the non-normative direction referred to switches from 
preferring $80 later to preferring $75 now.  
  Item 2. The format of this item followed that of Item 1. The first part appeared as follows:  
 
“If you had a choice, would you prefer $60 now OR $90 in 3 months?” 
  
1. Very strongly prefer $60 now 
2. Strongly prefer $60 now 
3. Prefer $60 now 
4. Prefer $90 in 3 months 
5. Strongly prefer $90 in 3 months 
6. Very strongly prefer $90 in 3 months 
 
 
The second corresponding part appeared as follows at a later point in time during the experiment: 
 
 
“Let’s consider the choice between $60 now VERSUS $90 in 3 months. 
  
There would be a good reason to wait 3 months for $90 instead of taking $60 right now. 
Waiting for an extra $30 is getting a 50% return for just waiting 3 months. This would 
amount to a 200% return based on an annual interest rate. This is an extraordinarily higher 
return than most banks or investment firms would give you. They would give you less 
than a 5% annual interest rate.   
  
Based on this information, what would you prefer?” 
1. Very strongly prefer $60 now 
2. Strongly prefer $60 now 
3. Prefer $60 now 
4. Prefer $90 in 3 months 
5. Strongly prefer $90 in 3 months 
6. Very strongly prefer $90 in 3 months 
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  Participants who preferred any of the “$60 now” options for the first item were 
considered Now Choosers, while those who preferred any of the $90 in 3 months options were 
considered Later Choosers. Participants within each group were further divided into one of two 
groups based on their performance during the second item: Switchers and Non-Switchers. 
Switchers were those who changed their reward preferences when subsequently provided with a 
reason to choose $90 in 3 months over $30 now. Refer to Figure 2 for a depiction of the resulting 
categories.  
 
  Part 1  
 
 
Part 2 
 $60 Now  Wait 3 months for $90  
$60 Now  Non-Switcher Switcher  
(Not Ideal) 
 
Wait 3 months for $90 Switcher  
(Ideal) 
Non-Switcher  
 
Figure 2. Between-Subject grouping categories for Item 2 in the Understanding/Acceptance: 
Reason to wait task.   
 
  Each of the temporal discounting questions in the Understanding/Acceptance-Reason To 
Wait tasks were characterized with delayed rewards that yielded annual interest rates greater than 
200%. Thus waiting for the delayed reward was considered the rational, normative (ideal), 
choice.  
    Understanding/Acceptance-Invariance Task. This task included three parts. The first 
part asked participants to choose between $70 now and $110 in 6 months, and the second part 
asked participants to choose between $70 in 12 months and $110 in 18 months. Participants were 
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divided into two groups based on their answers to these questions: Consistent Responders and 
Inconsistent Responders. Consistent Responders chose the same reward preference for both parts. 
Inconsistent responders chose different reward preferences for both parts. The normative 
response would have been to choose the same reward preference for both, because waiting for the 
delayed reward in each of the choices yields the same return. These two parts appeared as 
follows:  
“If you had a choice, would you prefer $70 now OR $110 in 6 months?” 
1. Very strongly prefer $70 now 
2. Strongly prefer $70 now 
3. Prefer $70 now 
4. Prefer $110 in 6 months 
5. Strongly prefer $110 in 6 months 
6. Very strongly prefer $110 in 6 months 
 
“If you had a choice, would you prefer $70 in 12 months OR $110 in 18 months?” 
7. Very strongly prefer $70 now 
8. Strongly prefer $70 now 
9. Prefer $70 now 
10. Prefer $110 in 18 months 
11. Strongly prefer $110 in 18 months 
12. Very strongly prefer $110 in 18 months 
 
  At a later point in time, participants were presented with a third part that included these 
two temporal discounting items again and it was explained to them that both items consist of 
equal wait times and yield equivalent return rates. This item provided an explanation as to why it 
would be rational, and thus normative, to respond in the same way to each item and appeared as 
follows: 
 
  “Consider the following two situations: 
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Situation 1 offers a choice between $70 now or $110 in 6 months. 
  
Situation 2 offers a choice between $70 in 12 months or $110 in 18 months. 
   
In 12 months, you will be in exactly the same situation as in the first choice – you could 
be receiving $70 now or $110 in 6 months. 
  
  Based on this information, please make your choices below” 
 
  Participants were further divided into groups based on their reward preferences. Non-
switchers were those participants whose temporal discounting preferences for the two situations 
were not impacted by our explanation. Switchers were those participants whose temporal 
discounting preferences for these two temporal discounting situations were impacted by our 
explanation.  Refer to Figure 3 for a depiction of the resulting categories.  
 
  a)   Part 2 
  $70 in 12 months  $110 in 18 months 
Part 1 $70 now Consistent Responders Inconsistent Responders 
 $110 in 6 months Inconsistent Responders Consistent Responder 
  
b) 
  Part 3 
  Consistent Responders  Inconsistent Responders 
Part 1 and 2 Consistent Responders Non-Switchers Switchers (non-normative) 
Inconsistent Responders  Switchers (normative) Non-switchers 
  
Figure 3. Between-Subject grouping categories for Item 3 in the Understanding/Acceptance- 
Reason to wait task.   
 
   
Procedure. The procedure in Study Two followed that of Study One. 
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Results 
 
Understanding/Acceptance- Reason To Wait Task. As previously explained, the 
Understanding Acceptance-Reason to Wait Task included two items. The two items included two 
parts each: 1) a temporal discounting item that asked participants to choose between a smaller, 
sooner reward and a larger, delayed reward, and 2) a subsequent item that provided participants 
with the same choice and a compelling reason to prefer the larger, delayed reward. The number 
of participants who respond non-normatively (or not optimally) across the three parts of this task 
prior to being given our reasons to is displayed in Table 1 below. 
 
 
Table 1.  
Number of Participants who Chose the Non-normative Response for Each Item in the 
Understanding/Acceptance-Reason to Wait Task.   
 
Understanding/Acceptance Item N Non-normative Response (n) Normative Response (n) 
Item 1) $75 now or $80 in 1 week 168 $75 now (n= 69) $80 in 1 week (n=99) 
Item 2) $60 now or $90 in 3 months 168 $60 now (n=74) 90 in 1 week (n=94) 
  
  Separate analysis were conducted on Items 1 and 2 of the Understanding/Acceptance-
Reason to Wait Task in order to determine whether providing participants with a compelling 
reason to prefer larger, delayed rewards will improve decision-making towards preferring larger, 
delayed rewards in either Items.   
   Understanding/Acceptance-Reason to Wait Item 1. Table 2 describes the proportion of 
participants who initially chose $75 dollars now and switched their temporal discounting 
preferences after being provided with an argument to choose $80 in 1 week, and the proportion of 
participants who initially chose $80 in 1 week and changed their answer to $75 now. Upon being 
given our reason to choose $80 in 1 week over $75 now, 31 (44.9%) Now Choosers switched 
their answers while 38 (55.1%) Now Choosers again chose $75 now; while 74 (27%) of the 
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Later Choosers continued to prefer $80 in 1 week, 25 (25%) of the Later Choosers who initially 
chose $80 in 1 week switched to choosing $75 now.  
  The proportion of participants who chose $70 now and switched their answers to $80 in 1 
week was significant X2 (1, N=168)=0.07, p< .01. This proportion was also significantly greater 
than the number of participants who initially chose $80 in 1 week and then switched their 
answers in the negative direction towards preferring $75 now (refer to Table 2).  
 
Table 2.  
Test Statistics and Percentage of Participants who Changed their Responses on the Second 
Administration of Item One in the Understanding/Acceptance- Reason to Wait Task. 
 
Initial Response  n % Who Switched 
Preferences (n) 
Chi-Square 
Not Ideal: $75 Now  69 44.9% (31) X2 (1, N=168)= 0.71** 
Ideal: $80 Later  99 25.3% (25) Phi= -.21, Cramer’s V= .21 
**. significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
   Understanding/Acceptance- Reason to Wait Item 2. The first part asked participants to 
choose between $60 now and $90 in 3 months. The second part asked participants to choose 
between $60 now and $90 in 3 months, but it also included an explanation that explained why 
participants should choose $60 in 3 months. Participants were divided into two groups: $60 Now 
Choosers (n=37, 44%) and $90 Later Choosers (n=77, 56%). Upon being given our reason to 
choose $90 in 3 months over $60 now, 37 (50%) Now Choosers switched their answers while 37 
(50%) Now Choosers again chose smaller, sooner rewards; while 77 (81.9%) Later Choosers 
continued to prefer $90 in 3 months, 17 (18.1%) of the Later Choosers who initially chose $90 in 
3 months switched to choosing $60 now. Table 3 displays the proportion of participants who 
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changed their temporal discounting preferences after being provided with a rational reason to 
choose the larger delayed reward for the temporal discounting choice in Part 2.  
  The proportion of participants who chose $60 now and switched their answers to $90 in 3 
months was significant X2  (1, N=168) = 19.37, p <.001. This proportion was also significantly 
greater than the number of participants who initially chose $90 in 3 months and then switched 
their answers in the negative direction towards preferring $60 now (refer to Table 3).  
 
Table 3.  
Test Statistics and Percentage of Participants Who Changed Their Responses on the Second 
Administration of Item Two in the Understanding/Acceptance- Reason to Wait Task. 
 
Initial Response  n % Who Switched 
Reward Preferences  (n) 
Chi-Square 
Not Ideal: $60 Now  74 50% (37) X2 (1, N=168)= 19.37*** 
Ideal: $90 Later  94 18.1% (17) Phi= -.34 Cramer’s V= .34 
  ***.significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
 
  Understanding/Acceptance- Invariance. The Understanding/Acceptance-Invariance 
Task included 3 parts: 1) a part that required participants to choose between $70 now and $110 in 
6 months, 2) a part that required participants to choose between $70 in 12 months and $110 in 18 
months, and 3) a part that presented participants with both of these items at once and explained to 
participants that both items are similar in that they yield equivalent wait times and annual return. 
The goal was to determine whether providing participants with a reason to make consistent 
decisions would improve decision-making towards choosing the same reward preference across 
similar temporal discounting situations.  
  Participants were divided into two groups based on their answers to the first two parts (1. 
between $70 now and $110 in 6 months, and 2. between $70 in 12 months and $110 in 18 
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months): Consistent responders chose the same reward preference for both parts whereas 
Inconsistent responders chose different reward preferences for both parts. At a later point in the 
battery, participants were presented with the third part, which presented them with these two 
temporal discounting choices again and it was explained to them that both choices consist of 
equal wait times and yield equivalent return rates. Non-switchers were those participants whose 
temporal discounting preferences for these two items were not changed by our explanation. 
Switchers are those participants whose temporal discounting preferences for these two items were 
changed by our explanation. Table 4 indicates the proportion of participants who initially chose 
two inconsistent preferences for each part and changed their answers following our explanation in 
part three.  
 
Table 4.  
Test Statistics and Percentage of Participants who Changed their Responses After being Given a 
Reason to Make Consistent Reward Choices in the Understanding/Acceptance-Invariance Task.   
 
 
Initial Response  n % Who Switched 
Responses (n) 
Chi-Square 
Consistent Responders 121 24.0% (29) X2 (1, N=168)= 15.11*** 
Inconsistent Responders  47 55.3% (26) Phi= .30, Cramer’s V= .30 
***.significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
 
  Of the 47 inconsistent responders who initially chose two different answers to the 
equivalent temporal discounting items, 55.3% switched their answers to preferring the same 
reward preference subsequent to evaluating our argument. This proportion was significantly 
different from the percentage of inconsistent responders that did not switch their answers, X2 (1, 
N=168)= 15.11, p<.001. This proportion was also significantly greater than the percentage of 
consistent responders who switched their answers in the non-normative 
	  47	  
preferring two different rewards for the equivalent temporal discounting items (refer to Table 5).  
General Discussion 
 
  In Study One, we found that more willingness to wait for larger delayed rewards was 
associated with higher intellectual ability and stronger critical thinking dispositions. As predicted, 
more willingness to wait for larger delayed rewards on the Mixed temporal discounting task was 
significantly correlated with stronger intellectual ability and thinking dispositions for items in the 
high annual return category. Furthermore, critical thinking dispositions significantly predicted 
more willingness to wait for larger delayed rewards in the Staircase and Mixed tasks even after 
controlling for intellectual ability. These results provide evidence to support decisions to wait for 
larger delayed rewards may involve more effortful thinking and consideration (McClure et al., 
2004), especially when the long-term gain is relatively high. In Study One, we did not find that 
response consistency across temporal discounting choices was significantly associated with 
higher intellectual ability or stronger critical thinking dispositions. Contrary to predictions, 
response consistency in the Invariance task did not correlate with intellectual ability or thinking 
dispositions. These results indicate that choosing two inconsistent reward preferences for two 
parallel temporal discounting items is not a decision that is necessarily void of effortful thinking 
or consideration.   
  In Study Two, we found that giving participants explanations to select larger delayed 
rewards and to choose consistent reward options lead participants to alter their initial rewards 
preferences. Consistent with our first prediction, a significant proportion of participants who 
initially chose the smaller sooner rewards, switched preferences after giving them an explanation 
to select the larger delayed rewards. Consistent with our second prediction, a significant 
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proportion of participants who initially chose inconsistent reward preferences also altered 
preferences after giving them an explanation to make consistent choices. These results suggest 
participants who do not switch preferences after being given explanations to choose larger 
delayed rewards and to choose consistent reward preferences may not be engaging in good 
decision-making.  
  These findings all converge to suggest that some temporal discounting choices are better 
than others. These findings are discussed in further detail below with respect to using 1) annual 
return rates as an index of rational temporal discounting preferences (Study One), 2) response 
consistency as an index of rational temporal discounting preferences (Study One), and 3) the 
understanding/acceptance principle as an index of rational temporal discounting preferences 
(Study Two).   
Annual Return Rates as an Index of Rational Temporal Discounting Preferences 
 
 Results in Study One indicate that annual rates of return may be used to operationalize 
temporal discounting items as an index of rationality. Our results suggest that waiting for larger 
delayed rewards when the potential for long-term gain is relatively high (i.e. high annual return) 
may be considered a rational choice. Consistent with our first hypothesis, we found that higher 
intellectual ability and stronger critical thinking dispositions associated with more willingness to 
wait for larger delayed rewards in the Staircase task and Mixed task when the annual return was 
high. We demonstrated that decisions to wait for larger delayed rewards in the Staircase task and 
the Mixed task (for high levels of annual return) were significantly related to higher intellectual 
ability. We also demonstrated that decisions to wait for larger delayed rewards in the Staircase 
and Mixed task (for high levels of annual return) were significantly related to stronger thinking 
dispositions linked to cognitive persistence and flexibility, and that people who were more 
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disposed to effortful thinking were more likely to wait for larger delayed rewards. We assessed 
dispositions towards actively open-minded thinking, intellectual curiosity and enjoyment, motive 
to act according to reason, consideration of future consequences, and superstitious thinking. It has 
been thought that people who tend to be open-minded, intellectually curious, motivated to act 
according to reason, considerate of future consequences, and resilient to superstitious thinking are 
more inclined to engage in more effortful decision-making that involves planning, reasoning, and 
analytical evaluation (Perkins, Jay & Tishman, 1992; Stanovich, 2008; Stanovich, 2009).  
  In the Mixed task, more participants tended to select larger delayed rewards when the 
annual rates of return were relatively high. As the annual returns increased with each item, the 
number of participants that chose the larger delayed rewards also generally increased (refer to 
column three in Table 1). Participants recognized that they should choose the larger delayed 
rewards when the long-term gains were relatively high. Additionally, higher intellectual ability 
and stronger critical thinking dispositions were significantly correlated with more willingness to 
wait for larger delayed rewards on items that yielded high annual return. Intellectual ability and 
critical thinking dispositions were not significantly correlated with more willingness to wait for 
larger delayed rewards on items that yielded relatively low or medium annual return. In other 
words, participants that were more willing to wait for larger delayed rewards when the long-term 
gain was relatively high, were also more likely to display higher intellectual ability and stronger 
critical thinking dispositions. Participants that were more willing to wait for larger delayed 
rewards when the gains were relatively low were not necessarily more likely to display higher 
intellectual ability or stronger critical thinking. This pattern of results suggests that making the 
decision to wait for larger delayed rewards when the potential for gain is relatively low (i.e., low 
or medium annual return) does not necessarily require effortful thinking or consideration. In 
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contrast, making decisions to wait for larger delayed rewards when the potential long-term gain is 
relatively high (i.e., high annual return) requires more effortful thinking and consideration.  Thus 
not waiting for larger delayed rewards when the potential for long-term gain is relatively low, 
may not necessarily be considered a non-rational decision.  However, not waiting for larger 
delayed rewards when the potential for long-term gain is relatively high may be considered a 
non-rational decision.  
Staircase Versus Mixed Methods. In Study One, the number of participants that selected 
the larger delayed reward for a specific level of annual return tended to be larger in the Staircase 
task (e.g., when the annual return was 33%, 99 participants chose the larger delayed reward) than 
in the Mixed task (e.g., when the annual return was 36%, 38 participants chose the larger delayed 
reward). This finding is important because it suggests that the order in which items are presented 
in a temporal discounting task can impact overall reward preferences. In the Staircase task, where 
items are presented in decreasing order, a participant’s point of indifference likely served as an 
anchor. In decision-making, the anchoring effect occurs when people rely on an initial piece of 
information to make all subsequent decisions (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1984). In the Staircase 
task, once participants decided to prefer the larger delayed reward to the smaller sooner reward, 
very few of them went back to preferring the smaller sooner rewards. In the Mixed task, items 
were presented in random order and thus one’s point of indifference is not easily perceivable. 
Thus the indifference point cannot serve as an anchor. However, decisions in the Mixed task may 
be related to one another in that participants may eventually recognize that some items yield 
relatively larger long-term gain (e.g., high annual returns of 9000%) than others (e.g., low annual 
returns of 33%).  
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These results are consistent with prior research. Robles and Vargas (2007) showed that 
Staircase and Mixed methods are highly correlated but that they result in different degrees of 
temporal discounting overall. Robles and Vargas (2007) concluded that these differences do not 
threaten interpretation of data. However, in the Staircase task, items prior to one’s indifference 
point likely invoke qualitatively different thought processes than items after one’s indifference 
point. This would not apply to items in the Mixed task, which are presented in random order. 
Thus performance on the Staircase task may not always be directly comparable to performance 
on the Mixed task.     
Response Consistency as an Index of Rational Temporal Discounting Preferences 	  
  Results of Study One indicated that response consistency in temporal discounting 
preferences was not associated with more effortful thinking. It has been suggested that rational 
thinkers are more likely to respond in a consistent manner across similar situations (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986), and that preference reversals in temporal discounting choices are reflective of 
non-rational behavior (Greene, Festoe, & Myerson, 2004). Contrary to our second hypothesis, 
intellectual ability and critical thinking dispositions did not correlate with greater response 
consistency in the Invariance task. In other words, participants that responded consistently across 
two parallel temporal discounting items (e.g., “Do you prefer $50 now or $100 in One week” and 
“Do you prefer $50 in one week or $100 in two weeks”) were not more likely to display higher 
intellectual ability or stronger critical thinking dispositions. If intellectual ability and critical 
thinking skills do not differentiate between people who respond consistently and people who 
reverse preferences, then it is possible that preference reversals may not always be entirely 
indicative of non-rational decision-making.  
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  There may be various explanations why participants were more or less consistent when 
making temporal discounting choices in the Invariance task that are not strongly related to 
intellectual ability or thinking dispositions. First, some participants might have the general 
tendency to wait for larger delayed rewards regardless of the choice offered and thus would have 
scored high response consistency in the Invariance task. In contrast, some participants might have 
the general tendency to prefer smaller sooner rewards to larger delayed rewards regardless of the 
choices offered and thus would have also scored high consistency in the Invariance task. These 
response patterns may be less reflective of rational and effortful thinking, and more attributable 
to general habits. Second, it has been suggested that humans prefer to plan for the future but that 
they tend to behave non-rationally today (e.g., McClure, 2004). For example, dieters may make 
non-rational decisions today even though they do not plan to make those decisions in the future. 
When given the choice between $50 today and $100 in one week, a person may choose the $50 
today, which would result in less potential for long term gain. When given a choice between $50 
in one week and $100 in two weeks, this same person is likely to switch preferences and prefer 
the $100 in two weeks, which would result in more potential for long term gain. This preference 
reversal may be less indicative of non-rational thinking, and more indicative of the human 
tendency to rationally plan for the future while behaving non-rationally in the moment. Third, in 
the Invariance task, there are two competing indices of rational choice: responding consistency 
and choosing larger delayed rewards. It is possible that some participants were more focused on 
deciding when to or not to wait for the larger delayed reward and less concerned with whether or 
not their choices were consistent across temporal discounting items.  
  In Study One, intellectual ability and thinking dispositions were related to response 
consistency in the Invariance task, only when participants consistently chose larger later 
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rewards for two parallel items (e.g., preferred the $100 reward when offered 1) the choice 
between $50 now or $100 in one week and $2) 50 in one week and $100 in 2 weeks).  This 
relationship was stronger than the association between intellectual ability and a preference for 
later rewards irrespective of response consistency. This pattern of results suggests that while 
response consistency may not be a clear indicator of rational decision-making on temporal 
discounting tasks, response consistency paired with a preference for larger delayed rewards may 
reflect better decision-making than response consistency paired with smaller sooner rewards.   
Understanding/Acceptance as an Index of Rational Temporal Discounting Preferences  
 
 In Study Two, we found that reward preferences changed significantly after participants 
were given an explanation to prefer larger delayed rewards. We also found that a significant 
proportion of participants switched from two inconsistent reward preferences to two consistent 
reward preferences after being given an explanation to respond consistently.  
  Understanding/Acceptance- Reason to Wait. Consistent with our first hypothesis, a 
significant proportion of participants who initially chose the smaller sooner rewards in our 
Understanding/Acceptance task, switched preferences after being given an explanation to select 
the larger delayed rewards. This suggests that evaluating temporal discounting choices based on 
annual return rates is an axiom that was understood and accepted by a significant proportion of 
participants. Based on methods used by Slovic and Tversky (1974) and Stanovich and West 
(1999), it was inferred that the significant proportion of Now Choosers who switched their 
preferences on the second administration of the temporal discounting item, understood, accepted, 
and used the reason we gave them to prefer larger delayed rewards. We may thus claim, 
according to the understanding/acceptance principle (Slovic and Tversky, 1974; Stanovich & 
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West, 2000), that our explanation was rational as it presumably lead to a significant number of 
switches in the normative direction. This finding is important for two reasons.  
 First, if a significant proportion of participants understood and accepted our explanation 
to choose larger delayed rewards based on the annual return rates, then further support is given to 
using return rates as a way to score temporal discounting preferences in our Mixed task in Study 
One. Temporal discounting decisions that involve relatively higher rates of return should be more 
likely to invoke more optimal responses (i.e., more willingness to wait for larger delayed 
rewards). In Study Two, people accepted 347% and 200% annual returns as rational reasons to 
wait for the larger delayed rewards. Results of Study One indicated that in the Mixed task, items 
that yielded interest rates between 1500 percent and 9125 percent, may be especially useful for 
distinguishing between rational and non-rational preferences when pitted against items that 
yielded lower interest rates between five percent and 585 percent.  
  Second, these results suggest that initial preferences for smaller sooner rewards were not 
based on strong rational reasons. Benjamin et al., (2006) found that asking participants to provide 
reasons for their temporal discounting choices lead to significant increases in choices for larger 
delayed rewards. This finding suggests that encouraging participants to think more about their 
temporal discounting choices leads to a greater willingness to wait for larger delayed rewards, 
which may thus be conceptualized as a more rational choice. Similarly, by providing participants 
in Study Two with a reason to choose larger delayed rewards, we may have provoked participants 
to think more rationally about their reward preferences. We can infer from the significant 
increase in choices for larger delayed rewards, that our reason for choosing larger delayed 
rewards was more rational than a participant’s initial reason for choosing smaller sooner rewards.  
According to the understanding/acceptance principle, it may be assumed that people whose 
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preferences continued to deviate from normative standards on the second administration of our 
understanding/acceptance items did not behave rationally (Slovic and Tversky, 1974; Stanovich 
& West, 1999). Our results suggest that the proportion of people who used our reason to choose 
delayed rewards based on return rates was significantly greater than the proportion of people who 
did not. As previously explained, this is evidence to support that high return rates are a rational 
reason to wait for larger delayed rewards. Yet some participants a) continued to choose smaller 
sooner rewards or b) switched from preferring later delayed rewards to preferring smaller sooner 
rewards despite having a rational reason to choose larger delayed rewards. As such, it may be 
assumed that people who did not perform normatively on the second administration of our 
understanding/acceptance items may not have been engaging in rational-thinking (Stanovich & 
West, 1999).  
  Understanding/Acceptance- Invariance. Consistent with our second hypothesis, a 
significant proportion of participants who initially chose inconsistent reward preferences also 
altered preferences after being given an explanation to make consistent choices. We were able to 
influence a significant proportion of inconsistent choosers to choose more consistently by 
explaining to them that the two temporal discounting items provide to them are actually highly 
similar in that they yield equivalent annual returns. Thus responding consistently across two 
parallel temporal discounting items based on our explanation that both items yield the same 
annual returns was an axiom that was understood and accepted by a significant proportion of 
participants.  It follows that using this axiom to make more normative decisions reflects rational 
behavior. In contrast, continuing to make inconsistent choices despite being aware of this axiom 
is reflective of non-rational behavior (Stanovich & West, 1999).  
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   It is important to highlight that we cannot conclude that response inconsistency during 
temporal discounting tasks necessarily reflects poor rational thinking, as this relationship was not 
entirely supported by our findings in Study One. Results of Study One suggested that even those 
participants who display higher intellectual ability and stronger critical thinking dispositions may 
not have been aware that response consistency is more rational than response inconsistency. 
However, results in Study Two suggested that we might able to use the 
Understanding/Acceptance principle as a way to gage whether participants will make better 
decisions once all are made aware of why response consistency is more rational than response 
inconsistency. If our reason to respond consistently is one that is accepted and used as a rational 
axiom for making temporal discounting choices, then it may be assumed that people whose 
preferences continued to be inconsistent despite being aware of this axiom were not behaving 
rationally. Response consistency may then be useful for measuring temporal discounting 
preferences while minimizing the influence of contextual factors that may make a participant 
more apt to select smaller sooner rewards over larger delayed rewards.      
Summary of Main Findings 	  
 By considering relative long-term gains (i.e., annual rates of return), associations with 
intellectual ability and thinking dispositions, and understanding/acceptance paradigms, we have 
demonstrated that for certain temporal discounting choices it is better to wait for the larger 
delayed reward and that choosing to wait is more effortful for participants. These results are also 
consistent with prior research that demonstrated associations between a preference for larger 
delayed rewards and higher intellectual ability (Shamosh & Gray, 2008), stronger orientation to 
the future (Steinberg et al., 2009), and more effortful cognition in neural studies (McClure et al., 
2004). These results are also consistent with prior research in the rational thinking literature 
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that demonstrated significant correlations between good decision-making and higher intellectual 
ability, stronger critical thinking dispositions, and more effortful cognition (Evans, 2003; 
Stanovich, 2008; 2009; Kahneman, 2011). That waiting for a larger delayed reward can be 
considered the better, more effortful choice under certain task conditions lends scientific support 
to conceptualizing and using temporal discounting as an indicator of instrumental rationality.  
Temporal Discounting as an Indicator of Instrumental Rationality 
 
In difficult, complex, or unfamiliar situations, an overreliance on emotions, instinct, and 
intuition can lead humans to make bad decisions (Evans, 2003; Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 2008; 
Stanovich, 2009; 2011; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2012). In such situations, 
it would be more effective to engage in more effortful cognitive processing and evaluation. 
Instrumental rationality, or one’s ability to get what one wants, may often consist of deliberate 
and effortful cognitive processing for effective goal setting and planning (Stanovich, 2011; 
Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2012). Our results in combination with prior research (Ostaszewski, 
1996; Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, & Brady, 2003; Zhong & DeVoe, 2010; McClure et al., 2004) 
suggest that a preference for smaller immediate rewards may be conceptualized as a measure of 
impulsive, emotional, or instinctual decision-making. In contrast, a preference for larger delayed 
rewards may be conceptualized as a measure of one’s ability to engage in instrumental rationality 
and in deeper, more effortful reasoning that targets maximization of outcomes.   
Participants that are high in instrumental rationality should seek choices that offer the 
greatest gain. In Study One, our results indicated that participants who displayed higher 
intellectual ability and stronger critical thinking dispositions were more likely to recognize that 
waiting for larger delayed rewards in our temporal discounting tasks was more beneficial than 
accepting the smaller sooner rewards, especially when the long term gains were relatively high 
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(i.e., temporal discounting choices with high annual return). An over-reliance on intuition or 
emotion can interfere with rational decision-making, sometimes even despite high intellectual 
ability (Stanovich, 2009; Kahneman, 2011). We assessed thinking dispositions that are thought to 
impact whether a person with sufficient intellectual ability will actually use those abilities when 
making decisions (Perkins, Jay & Tishman, 1992; Stanovich, 2008; Stanovich & West, 2011). A 
person with more actively open-minded thinking may be more willing to wait for larger delayed 
rewards because he/she generally tends to question his/her options and generate multiple 
scenarios for each option. A person with stronger need for cognition and stronger motive to act 
according to reason may be more likely to recognize that larger delayed rewards are the optimal 
choice because he/she’s intellectual curiosity and desire to behave rationally urges he/she to be 
analytic, thorough, and precise when making decisions. A person with stronger tendency to 
consider the future consequences of his/her decisions may be more likely to determine that larger 
delayed rewards yield greater outcomes. Finally, a person who is high in superstitious thinking, 
may show stronger preferences for smaller sooner rewards because he/she does not have the 
general tendency to base his/her decisions on reason or computational formulas. These thinking 
dispositions may contribute to whether a person will pause when faced with temporal discounting 
choices, in favor of engaging in more effortful reasoning in order to maximize potential 
outcomes. Those who are not motivated to behave rationally or not disposed to persistent and 
flexible thinking are likely prone to preferring immediate rewards despite long-term loss, in part 
because they lack the general tendencies to pause and consciously consider the long-term 
implications to all of their potential choices. A failure to consider the long-term implications of 
one’s choices would likely interfere with instrumental rationality. A person cannot effectively set 
and reach optimum goals if they fail to pause and consider their options. Results in Study One 
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have indicated that thinking dispositions might impact temporal discounting preferences even 
despite high intellectual ability. We showed that thinking dispositions accounted for significant 
unique variance in preferences for larger delayed rewards. In Study Two, we showed that even if 
participants do not initially recognize that the long term gains in waiting for the larger delayed 
rewards outweigh the short term gains in accepting the smaller rewards, we can provoke a 
significant proportion of participants to make better choices by explaining to them what they 
stand to gain by waiting. Participants that were higher in instrumental rationality would be more 
likely to accept and use our axiom for waiting for the larger delayed rewards.  
That preferences for larger delayed rewards may be conceptualized as instrumentally 
rational is further supported by a series of experiments conducted by Kim, Schnall, and White 
(2013). Participants were more likely to choose larger delayed rewards when the rewards were 
offered to them as travel vouchers with specific details about quality and location of hotels, rather 
than as 1) travel vouchers without the specific details about quality and location of hotels or 2) as 
basic monetary rewards. These findings coincide with our results, which demonstrated that 
thinking dispositions related to being open-minded, flexible, and considerate of future 
consequences were significantly predictive of more willingness to wait for larger delayed 
rewards. These findings suggest that participants were not considering the future utility of larger 
delayed rewards.  
 Measuring Rationality. Many recognize that traditional tests of intelligence miss 
important skills related to emotion, empathy, and interpersonal abilities, but assume that these 
tests encompass most of cognition (Stanovich, 2009). Intelligence tests (e.g., tests of IQ) do not 
encompass all aspects of cognition (Stanovich, 2009; Kahneman, 2011). They miss important 
traits related to rational-thinking, including judgment and decision-making. It is crucial that 
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researchers develop a rational-thinking test (i.e., a measure of RQ), comprised of tasks that assess 
the cognitive skills and dispositions that intelligence tests miss and that are required to make 
good decisions in the real world. Our results indicate that temporal discounting preferences may 
be used as one index of rationality.   
 We showed that although these thinking dispositions are related to intellectual ability, 
they account for significant unique variance in preferences for larger delayed rewards suggesting 
that dispositional thinking styles can interfere with willingness to wait for larger delayed rewards 
despite one’s intellectual ability. Our findings thus provide further evidence to support that 
rational-thinking and intelligence are two separable constructs and that intelligence and rational-
thinking are both related to preferences for larger delayed rewards. Intelligence and rationality 
involve different processes. Performances on rational-thinking tasks are more strongly related to 
one another than to performance on measures of intelligence/executive functions (Stanovich, 
2009; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). We can see 
instances in our typical everyday environments of intelligent people making bad decisions 
(Stanovich, 2009; Kahneman, 2011). For example, we may witness a university student choosing 
to socialize over study, know of a friend who spends a little too much money, or hear of a lawyer 
who is addicted to alcohol. Intelligence tests measure one’s abilities, or for an analogy, the size of 
one’s car engine; they fail to predict how good one will be at using those abilities in real 
situations, or to continue the analogy, at driving one’s car. Our results indicated that rational-
thinking tests (i.e., measures of RQ) might be able to incorporate temporal discounting tasks as 
indicators of impulsive decision-making, which intelligence tests fail to assess (Stanovich, 2009; 
Toplak, West, Stanovich, 2011). Study One and Study Two provided converging evidence to 
support that under certain task manipulations, strong preferences for larger delayed rewards 
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can be linked to more instrumental rationality. Our modified versions of the temporal discounting 
paradigm in Study One and Study Two allowed us to study temporal discounting as a construct of 
rationality.  
Practical Implications 
 
  Humans can be taught to think more critically (Burbules & Rupert, 1999; Ozturk, Muslu, 
& Dicle, 2007; Abrami, Bernard, Borokhovski, Wade et al., 2008). In contrast, intellectual 
ability, as measured by traditional tests of intelligence, is a relatively stable construct (e.g., 
Hertzog & Schaie, 1986; Canivas, 1999). In Study One, we showed that more willingness to wait 
for larger delayed rewards was significantly and uniquely predicted by critical thinking 
dispositions. In Study Two, we showed that explaining to participants their temporal discounting 
options could provoke participants to make better temporal discounting choices. Our results 
suggest that people may be influenced to think more critically about choosing immediate benefits 
at the expense of more beneficial delayed gains.  
  Thaler and Sunstein (2008) have argued that we can “nudge” people towards making 
certain decisions. A nudge is defined as, “any aspect of choice architecture that alters people’s 
behaviour in a predictable way without bidding forbidding any options or significantly changing 
their economic incentives”. Our results indicated that we similarly may be able to contribute to 
that line of research by showing that people can be “nudged” towards making more optimal 
temporal discounting choices. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) have discussed multiple ways that 
choices can be presented in our environment that will make a person more likely to choose the 
more optimal choice. For example, arranging food on a shelf in a school cafeteria in a certain way 
can influence children to make more healthy choices when buying their lunch. Arranging fruit so 
that it is at eye-level will provoke more children to purchase fruit over junk food.  
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 In Study One, we showed that the way a series of temporal discounting choices are 
framed could make people more or less likely to make better choices. The number of participants 
who chose the larger delayed reward for a specific level of annual return tended to be larger in 
the Staircase task (e.g., when the annual return was 33%, 99 participants chose the larger delayed 
reward) than in the Mixed task (e.g., when the annual return was 36%, 38 participants chose the 
larger delayed reward). Items in the Staircase task were presented in descending order while 
items in the Mixed task were presented in random order. Providing a participant with back to 
back choices that yield drastically different outcomes and gains in the Mixed task (i.e., presenting 
a participant with an item that yields relatively low annual return directly before presenting a 
participant with an item that yields relatively high return) may have an impact on how a 
participant will make a series of choices. A participant may be more likely to overvalue items 
with relatively high annual return or undervalue items with relatively low return. While 
presenting participants with temporal discounting choices in the Staircase that yield increasingly 
higher annual returns with each item, may invoke less bias in how each item is judged. These 
findings may be applied within banks and financial institutions in order to promote better 
decision-making when presenting people with mortgage, insurance, or investment options.   
  We have also shown that providing a good reason to prefer larger delayed rewards can 
“nudge” people towards changing their initial preferences for smaller sooner rewards. It is 
possible that this concept may be applied to other choices in our environment to alter choice 
architecture so that people are pushed towards making more optimal financial choices. For 
example, strong preferences for smaller sooner rewards have previously been shown to associate 
with poor financial management (Meier & Sprenger, 2011). Credit card companies may be 
governed by laws that insist on explaining to credit card users the financial consequence to 
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accumulating large interest on their purchases. These explanations may be included on credit card 
bills and used to nudge people towards waiting to spend more and paying off their debts.    
 
 
Generalizability of Temporal Discounting as an Index of Rational Thinking  
   
  Some research has shown significant differences in temporal discounting across various 
personal, social, and environmental factors. Temporal discounting varies across age (Green, 
Myerson, Lichtman, Rosen & Fry, 1996; Steinberg et al., 2009). Adults were significantly more 
likely to wait for larger delayed rewards than children and adolescents (Green et al., 1996; 
Steinberg et al., 2009), and emerging adults showed significantly greater preferences for smaller 
sooner rewards than both adolescents and adults (Steinberg et al., 2009). Temporal discounting 
may also vary across socio-economical status. For example, adults with high income were 
significantly more likely than adults with low income to wait for larger delayed rewards (Green et 
al., 1996). Additionally, individuals who grew up in a resource rich environment were 
significantly more likely than individuals who grew up in a resource poor environment to wait for 
larger delayed rewards (Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & Robertson). Temporal discounting may 
also vary across different social contexts. For example, individuals who felt they were receiving a 
just and fair income in life were more likely than individuals who felt they were receiving an 
unjust and unfair income to wait for larger delayed rewards (Callan, Shead, & Olson; 2011). 
Callan, Harvey, and Sutton (2014) also showed that individuals who believed in a fair and just 
world were more likely than individuals who believed in an unfair and unjust world to wait for 
larger delayed rewards. Finally, people showed a significant increase in their preferences for 
smaller sooner rewards after surviving a major natural catastrophe (an earthquake). One’s age, 
income, and environmental context may all contribute to whether or not delaying gratification 
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in favor of waiting for larger delayed rewards is necessarily more beneficial than choosing 
smaller immediate rewards. For example, an individual whose social context does not provide 
fair treatment or security may be better off taking a smaller reward that offers immediate and 
certain gain than to risk waiting for a larger reward.  
Future Considerations 	  
  There are several suggestions for future directions. In Study One, the temporal 
discounting items in the Staircase task and the Mixed task were not identical. In order to enable 
direct comparison of choices across these two methods and strength of correlations with 
individual differences measures, future studies should incorporate a Staircase task and a Mixed 
task that consist of identical items. In Study One, we did not compare performance on our 
temporal discounting tasks to performance on other established measures of rational decision-
making.  Future studies should compare temporal discounting performance to an established 
measure of rational decision-making. Results in Study Two suggested that a significant 
proportion of participants would make more consistent choices if the axiom of consistency were 
explained to them. Future temporal discounting studies should examine whether incorporating 
this axiom into the instructions given to a participant prior to administering a temporal 
discounting task will impact response patterns. Finally, we were not able to conclude that every 
switch towards preferring larger delayed rewards and responding more consistently in Study Two 
was definitely attributable to participants having accepted our axioms. Similarly, we were not 
able to conclude that participants who did not switch responses after being given our axioms to 
prefer larger delayed rewards and to respond consistently did not accept our axioms. In future 
studies, participants should be asked to explain why he/she decided to switch or to not switch 
his/her preferences in the Understanding/Acceptance tasks.    
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Conclusion 
 
  Specifically, we have provided new evidence to support that under certain task conditions, 
waiting for the larger delayed reward is a better decision that is associated with more effortful 
thinking. Our results indicated that certain temporal discounting preferences may be 
conceptualized as an index of instrumental rationality. We have also demonstrated novel methods 
to operationalize temporal discounting preferences as an index of rational decision-making. More 
generally, our results provided evidence to support existing research on the measureable 
differences between human rationality and human intelligence, and the utility of developing tests 
to measure impulsive decision-making as a component of instrumental rationality.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Measures 
 
Demographic Information 
 
1. Sex: Male ___ Female ___ 
2. Age: ____ 
 
3. Date of Birth (Month/Day/Year): 
 
4. Year in University:  
___ 1st year undergrad 
___ 2nd year undergrad 
___ 3rd year undergrad 
___ 4th year undergrad 
___ Graduated 
___ Post-BA Continuing 
 
5. Is English your first language? 
___ Yes   ___ No 
If no, how long have you been speaking English? ___________ Years 
 
6. What is your ethnic background?  
 
7. What was your final average at the end of high school? (percentage) ____% 
 
8. Estimate your current university average (estimate percentage): ____ % 
 
9. Mother’s highest level of education: 
____ less than high school 
____ high school 
____ some college 
____ BA degree 
____ MA degree 
____ PhD  
____ professional degree 
____ not applicable 
 
10. Father’s highest level of education: 
____ less than high school 
____ high school 
____ some college 
____ BA degree 
____ MA degree 
____ PhD  
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____ professional degree 
____ not applicable 
 
 
11. Did you ever receive special assistance in school to assist with learning? 
____ yes 
____ no 
If you indicated “yes” for the previous question, indicate what you received assistance for: (e.g., 
reading problems, math problems, attentional problems) 
 
12. Please indicate what your current (or intended) university major is: 
 
 
 
Temporal Discounting Tasks 
 
Instructions: For the next set of items, imagine that you are offered a choice between receiving a 
specific amount of money sooner or a larger amount later. Your choice would probably depend 
on how much greater the later amount is, and how long you would have to wait to get the larger 
amount.  For example, you probably would prefer receiving $500 right now rather than receiving 
$501 in 12 months. You also would prefer receiving $500 in 1 week rather than receiving $25 
right now.  
 
 
Staircase Task 
 
Do you prefer… 
 
$1, 990 now  or $2000 in 1 year 
$1, 980 now or $2000 in 1 year 
$1, 950 now or $2000 in 1 year 
$1, 900 now or $2000 in 1 year 
$1, 850 now or $2000 in 1 year 
$1, 800 now or $2000 in 1 year 
$1,700 now or $2000 in 1 year 
$1, 600 now or $2000 in 1 year 
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…  or $2000 in 1 year 
$1, 000 now or $2000 in 1 year 
$900 now or $2000 in 1 year 
$800 now or $2000 in 1 year 
… or $2000 in 1 year 
$50 now   or $2000 in 1 year 
$20 now or $2000 in 1 year 
 
 
 
 
Mixed Task 
 
(Note: These items were presented to participants in random order but they are rearranged below 
to reflect three separate levels of annual return)  
 
TD Mixed: Low Return Rate 
1. Do you prefer $34 now or $35 in 186 
days? 
2. Do you prefer $54 now or $55 in 117 
days? 
3. Do you prefer $75 now or $80 in 162 
days? 
4. Do you prefer $80 now or $85 in 157 
days? 
5. Do you prefer $47 now or $50 in 160 
days? 
6. Do you prefer $28 now or $30 in 179 
days? 
7. Do you prefer $67 now or $75 in 119 
days? 
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8. Do you prefer $54 now or $60 in 111 
days? 
9. Do you prefer $22 now or $25 in 136 
days? 
TD Mixed: Med Interest Rate 
1. Do you prefer $69 now or $85 in 91 
days? 
2. Do you prefer $49 now or $60 in 89 
days? 
3. Do you prefer $25 now or $30 in 80 
days? 
4. Do you prefer $55 now or $75 in 61 
days? 
5. Do you prefer $19 now or $25 in 53 
days? 
6. Do you prefer $40 now or $55 in 62 
days? 
7. Do you prefer $24 now or $35 in 29 
days? 
8. Do you prefer $34 now or $50 in 30 
days? 
9. Do you prefer $54 now or $80 in 30 
days? 
TD Mixed: High Interest Rate 
1. Do you prefer $14 now or $25 in 19 
days? 
2. Do you prefer $27 now or $50 in 21 
days? 
3. Do you prefer $41 now or $75 in 20 
days? 
4. Do you prefer $25 now or $60 in 14 
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days? 
5. Do you prefer $15 now or $35 in 13 
days? 
6. Do you prefer $33 now or $88 in 14 
days? 
7. Do you prefer $31 now or $85 in 7 days? 
8. Do you prefer $11 now or $30 in 7 days? 
9. Do you prefer $20 now or $55 in 7 days? 
 
 
 
Invariance Task 
 
(Note: These items were presented to participants in random order but they are rearranged below 
so that items that correspond to one another are grouped into pairs)  
 
 
Group One Group Two 
1. If you had a choice, would you prefer 
$340 now or $400 in 4 months? 
 
Very strongly prefer $340 now  
Strongly prefer $340 now  
Prefer $340 now  
Prefer $400 in 4 months  
Strongly prefer $400 in 4 months  
Very strongly prefer $400 in 4 months  
 
1. If you had a choice, would you prefer $340 
in 10 months or $400 in 14 months? 
 
Very strongly prefer $340 in 10 months  
Strongly prefer $340 in 10 months  
Prefer $340 in 10 months  
Prefer $400 in 14 months  
Strongly prefer $400 in 14 months  
Very strongly prefer $400 in 14 months  
 
  
  
2. If you had a choice, would you prefer 
$110 now or $120 in 4 weeks? 
2. If you had a choice, would you prefer $110 
in 8 weeks or $120 in 12 weeks? 
  
  
3. If you had a choice, would you prefer 
$65 now or $70 in 3 weeks? 
3. If you had a choice, would you prefer $65 in 
20 weeks or $70 in 23 weeks? 
  
  
4. If you had a choice, would you prefer 
$60 now or $90 in 3 months?  
4. If you had a choice, would you prefer $60 in 
10 months or $90 in 13 months? 
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5. If you had a choice, would you prefer 
$300 now or $315 in 1 week? 
5. If you had a choice, would you prefer $300 
in 20 weeks or $315 in 21 week? 
  
  
6. If you had a choice, would you prefer 
$150 now or $160 in 4 weeks? 
6. If you had a choice, would you prefer $150 
in 20 weeks or $160 in 24 weeks? 
  
  
7. If you had a choice, would you prefer 
$180 now or $200 in 2 weeks? 
7. If you had a choice, would you prefer $150 
in 20 weeks or $160 in 24 weeks? 
  
  
8. If you had a choice, would you prefer 
$95 now or $105 in 2 weeks? 
8. If you had a choice, would you prefer $95 in 
10 weeks or $105 in 12 weeks 
  
  
9. If you had a choice, would you prefer 
$75 now or $80 in 1 week? 
9. If you had a choice, would you prefer $75 in 
10 weeks or $80 in 11 weeks? 
  
  
10. If you had a choice, would you prefer 
$70 now or $110 in 6 months? 
10. If you had a choice, would you prefer $70 
in 12 months or $110 in 16 months? 
  
  
11. If you had a choice, would you prefer 
$235 now or $270 in 4 months? 
11. If you had a choice, would you prefer $235 
in 12 months or $270 in 16 months? 
  
  
12. If you had a choice, would you prefer 
$45 now or $50 in 4 weeks? 
12. If you had a choice, would you prefer $45 
in 10 weeks or $50 in 14 weeks? 
  
  
13. If you had a choice, would you prefer 
$210 now or $220 in 3 weeks? 
13. If you had a choice, would you prefer $210 
in 20 weeks or $220 in 23 weeks? 
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Understanding/Acceptance Task- Reason To Wait  
 
1. Let’s consider the choice between $60 now VERSUS $90 in 3 months. 
  
There would be a good reason to wait 3 months for $90 instead of taking $60 right now. Waiting 
for an extra $30 is getting a 50% return for just waiting 3 months. This would amount to a 200% 
return based on an annual interest rate. This is an extraordinarily higher return than most banks or 
investment firms would give you. They would give you less than a 5% annual interest rate.   
  
Based on this information, what would you prefer?   
   Very strongly prefer $60 now  
   Strongly prefer $60 now  
   Prefer $60 now  
   Prefer $90 in 3 months  
   Strongly prefer $90 in 3 months  
   Very strongly prefer $90 in 3 months  
 
 
 
2. Let’s consider the choice between $75 now VERSUS $80 in 1 week. 
  
There would be a good reason to wait 1 week for $80 instead of taking $75 right now. Waiting 
for an extra $5 is getting a 7% return for just waiting 1 week. This would amount to a 347% 
return based on an annual interest rate. This is an extraordinarily higher return than most banks or 
investment firms would give you. They would give you less than a 5% annual interest rate.  
  
  
Based on this information, what would you prefer?  
   Very strongly prefer $75 now  
   Strongly prefer $75 now  
   Prefer $75 now  
   Prefer $80 in 1 week  
   Strongly prefer $80 in 1 week  
   Very strongly prefer $80 in 1 week  
 
 
Understanding/Acceptance Task- Invariance  
 
 
1. Consider the following two situations: 
  
Situation 1 offers a choice between $70 now or $110 in 6 months. 
  
Situation 2 offers a choice between $70 in 12 months or $110 in 18 months. 
   
In 12 months, you will be in exactly the same situation as in the first choice – you could be 
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receiving $70 now or $110 in 6 months. 
  
Based on this information, please make your choices below.  
  
 
Situation #1 
   Very strongly prefer $70 now  
   Strongly prefer $70 now  
   Prefer $70 now  
   Prefer $110 in 6 months  
   Strongly prefer $110 in 6 months  
   Very strongly prefer $110 in 6 months  
 
 
Situation #2 
   Very strongly prefer $70 in 12 months  
   Strongly prefer $70 in 12 months  
   Prefer $70 in 12 months  
   Prefer $110 in 18 months  
   Strongly prefer $110 in 18 months  
 Very strongly prefer $110 in 18 months  
 
Vocabulary Checklist 
 
Instructions: Below you will see a list of 60 letter strings. Some of the strings are actual words 
and some are not. You are to read through the list of items and indicate whether or not you think 
the letter string is a word by clicking the box next to those that you know to be words. Do not 
guess, but only check those who you know to be words. 
 
 
1. absolution  _____ 31. neotatin  _____ 
2. arrate  _____ 32. niche  _____ 
3. asinine  _____ 33. nonquasity  _____ 
4. audible  _____ 34. nuance  _____ 
5. ceiloplaty  _____ 35. nitrous  _____ 
6. clandestine  _____ 36. optimize  _____ 
7. comectial  _____ 37. plabage  _____ 
8. concurrent  _____ 38. polarity  _____ 
9. confluence  _____ 39. potomite  _____ 
10. connote  _____ 40. purview  _____ 
11. denotation  _____ 41. recidivism  _____ 
12. denouement  _____ 42. reportage  _____ 
13. disconcert  _____ 43. reverent  _____ 
14. disler  _____ 44. rochead  _____ 
15. dropant  _____ 45. seblement  _____ 
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16. epicurean  _____ 46. sheal  _____ 
17. eventuate  _____ 47. sparkhouse  _____ 
18. fusigenic  _____ 48. stratagem  _____ 
19. gustation  _____ 49. subjugate  _____ 
20. heuristic  _____ 50. substratum  _____ 
21. hyplexion  _____ 51. suffuse  _____ 
22. ineffity  _____ 52. tenacious  _____ 
23. inflect  _____ 53. tradured  _____ 
24. inundate  _____ 54. tumcier  _____ 
25. irksome  _____ 55. ubiquitous  _____ 
26. lacuna  _____ 56. unction  _____ 
27. languor  _____ 57. unmanal  _____ 
28. laudatory  _____ 58. wanderlust  _____ 
29. litany  _____ 59. waterfowl  _____ 
30. metenetion  _____ 60. xenophobia  _____ 
 
 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
 
Instructions: Below is an example of a spatial matrix problem. In the top box is a pattern with a 
piece missing. Your task is to choose from the eight alternative pieces below the box and identify 
the correct one that completes the pattern at the top. 
 
Take a look at this example and see how it can be solved. First, you can see that each of the top 
two rows contains one circle, one square, and one diamond shape. Since the last row already 
contains a square and a circle, the missing piece must have a diamond shape. Thus, the answer 
must be either #2, #5, or #8. Looking further, you can see that the pieces in the top row have one 
line going through them, the pieces in the middle row have two lines going through them, and the 
pieces in the bottom row have three lines gong through them. Therefore, since you have 
eliminated all alternatives except #2, #5, and #8, the answer must be #5. You can check this by 
noting that in each row the lines are vertical in one piece, slanted to the left in one piece, and 
slanted to the right in another. You can confirm that #5 is the correct example by noting that its 
lines are slanted in the correct direction. 
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Study the example below. 
. 
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The computer will give you the rest of the matrix problems. There are 18 problems in all. The 
problems will get harder and harder as you go along, but the task is always the same, to pick the 
piece that you think best fits the pattern. No one should expect to solve all the problems, because 
some of them are very difficult and you will be working under a time limit. Just try to do as well 
as you can. You will have fifteen minutes to complete the 18 problems, so do not spend all of your 
time on one that you cannot answer. If you run out of time, please do NOT simply guess at 
problems you have not yet looked at. 
 
Note: This task included 18 items. Only the sample item is shown above.  
 
Dispositions Questionnaire 
 
Instructions:  
 
This questionnaire lists a series of statements about various topics. Read each statement and 
decide whether you agree or disagree with each statement as follows: 
 
1 - Disagree Strongly 
2 - Disagree Moderately 
3 - Disagree Slightly 
4 - Agree Slightly 
5 - Agree Moderately 
6 - Agree Strongly 
 
Mark the alternative that best describes your opinion. There are no right or wrong answers so do 
not spend too much time deciding on an answer. The first thing that comes to mind is probably 
the best response. There is no time limit, but work as quickly as possible. 
 
Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale  
1. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately 
necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.  
2. What beliefs you hold have more to do with your own personal character than the experiences 
that may have given rise to them.  
3. I tend to classify people as either for me or against me.  
4. A person should always consider new possibilities.  
5. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are 
against the truth.  
6. Changing your mind is a sign of weakness.  
7. I believe we should look to our religious authorities for decisions on moral issues.  
8. I think there are many wrong ways, but only one right way, to almost anything. 
9. It makes me happy and proud when someone famous holds the same beliefs that I do.  
10. Difficulties can usually be overcome by thinking about the problem, rather than through 
waiting for good fortune.  
11. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.  
12. Abandoning a previous belief is a sign of strong character.  
13. No one can talk me out of something I know is right.  
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14. Basically, I know everything I need to know about the important things in life.  
15. It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence is brought to bear against 
them.  
16. Considering too many different opinions often leads to bad decisions.  
17. There are basically two kinds of people in this world, good and bad.  
18. I consider myself broad-minded and tolerant of other people's lifestyles.  
19. Certain beliefs are just too important to abandon no matter how good a case can be made 
against them.  
20. Most people just don't know what's good for them.  
21. It is a noble thing when someone holds the same beliefs as their parents.  
22. Coming to decisions quickly is a sign of wisdom.  
23. I believe that loyalty to one's ideals and principles is more important than "open-mindedness."  
24. Of all the different philosophies which exist in the world there is probably only one which is 
correct.  
25. My beliefs would not have been very different if I had been raised by a different set of 
parents.  
26. If I think longer about a problem I will be more likely to solve it. 
27. I believe that the different ideas of right and wrong that people in other societies have may be 
valid for them. 
28. Even if my environment (family, neighborhood, schools) had been different, I probably 
would have the same religious views.  
29. There is nothing wrong with being undecided about many issues. 
30. I believe that laws and social policies should change to reflect the needs of a changing world.  
31. My blood boils over whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.  
32. I believe that the "new morality" of permissiveness is no morality at all.  
33. One should disregard evidence that conflicts with your established beliefs.  
34. Someone who attacks my beliefs is not insulting me personally.  
35. A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among its members cannot exist for 
long.  
36. Often, when people criticize me, they don't have their facts straight.  
37. Beliefs should always be revised in response to new information or evidence.  
38. I think that if people don't know what they believe in by the time they're 25, there's something 
wrong with them.  
39. I believe letting students hear controversial speakers can only confuse and mislead them.  
40. Intuition is the best guide in making decisions.  
41. People should always take into consideration evidence that goes against their beliefs.  
 
Master Rationality Motive Scale 
1.  I believe in following my heart more than my head.  
2.  I like to gather many different types of evidence before I decide what to do.  
3.  After I make a decision, it is often difficult for me to give logical reasons for it.  
4.  I think things through before coming to a decision.  
5.  I don't feel I have to have reasons for what I do.  
6.  I always consider the consequences before I take action. 
7.  I like to think that my actions are motivated by sound reasons.  
8.  It is more important to me than to most people to behave in a logical way.  
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9.  I like to have reasons for what I do.  
10.  I do not like to be too objective in the way I look at things.  
11. I am only confident of decisions that are made after careful analysis of all available 
information.  
12.  I don't like to have to justify my actions.  
13. If a belief suits me then I am comfortable, it really doesn’t matter if the belief is 
true.  
	  
Need	  for	  Cognition	  Scale	  	  1. I	  would	  prefer	  complex	  to	  simple	  problems.	  	  2. I	  like	  to	  have	  the	  responsibility	  of	  handling	  a	  situation	  that	  requires	  a	  lot	  of	  thinking.	  	  3. Thinking	  is	  not	  my	  idea	  of	  fun.	  	  4. I	  would	  rather	  do	  something	  that	  requires	  little	  thought	  than	  something	  that	  is	  sure	  to	  challenge	  my	  thinking	  abilities.	  	  5. I	  try	  to	  anticipate	  and	  avoid	  situations	  where	  there	  is	  likely	  a	  chance	  I	  will	  have	  to	  think	  in	  depth	  about	  something.	  	  6. I	  find	  satisfaction	  in	  deliberating	  hard	  and	  for	  long	  hours.	  	  7. I	  only	  think	  as	  hard	  as	  I	  have	  to.	  	  8. I	  prefer	  to	  think	  about	  small,	  daily	  projects	  to	  long-­‐term	  ones.	  	  9. I	  like	  tasks	  that	  require	  little	  thought	  once	  I’ve	  learned	  them.	  10. The	  idea	  of	  relying	  on	  thought	  to	  make	  my	  way	  to	  the	  top	  appeals	  to	  me.	  	  11. I	  really	  enjoy	  a	  task	  that	  involves	  coming	  up	  with	  new	  solutions	  to	  problems.	  	  12. Learning	  new	  ways	  to	  think	  doesn’t	  excite	  me	  very	  much.	  	  13. I	  prefer	  my	  life	  to	  be	  filled	  with	  puzzles	  that	  I	  must	  solve.	  14. The	  notion	  of	  thinking	  abstractly	  is	  appealing	  to	  me.	  	  15. I	  would	  prefer	  a	  task	  that	  is	  intellectual,	  difficult,	  and	  important	  to	  one	  that	  is	  somewhat	  important	  but	  does	  not	  require	  much	  thought.	  	  16. I	  feel	  relief	  rather	  than	  satisfaction	  after	  completing	  a	  task	  that	  required	  a	  lot	  of	  mental	  effort.	  	  17. It’s	  enough	  for	  me	  that	  something	  gets	  the	  job	  done;	  I	  don’t	  care	  how	  or	  why	  it	  works.	  18. I	  usually	  end	  up	  deliberating	  about	  issues	  even	  when	  they	  do	  not	  affect	  me	  personally.	  	  	  
Consideration of Future Consequences Scale 1.	  	  I	  consider	  how	  things	  might	  be	  in	  the	  future,	  and	  try	  to	  influence	  those	  things	  with	  my	  day	  to	  day	  behavior.	  	  2.	  	  Often	  I	  engage	  in	  a	  particular	  behavior	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  outcomes	  that	  may	  not	  result	  for	  many	  years.	  	  3.	  	  I	  only	  act	  to	  satisfy	  immediate	  concerns,	  figuring	  the	  future	  will	  take	  care	  for	  itself.	  	  4.	  	  My	  behavior	  is	  only	  influenced	  by	  the	  immediate	  (i.e.,	  a	  matter	  of	  days	  or	  weeks)	  outcomes	  of	  my	  actions.	  	  5.	  	  My	  convenience	  is	  a	  big	  factor	  in	  the	  decisions	  I	  make	  or	  the	  actions	  I	  take.	  	  6.	  	  I	  am	  willing	  to	  sacrifice	  my	  immediate	  happiness	  or	  well-­‐being	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  future	  outcomes.	  	  7.	  	  I	  think	  it	  is	  important	  to	  take	  warnings	  about	  negative	  outcomes	  seriously	  even	  if	  the	  negative	  outcome	  will	  not	  occur	  for	  many	  years.	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8.	  	  I	  think	  it	  is	  more	  important	  to	  perform	  a	  behavior	  with	  important	  distant	  consequences	  than	  a	  behavior	  with	  less-­‐important	  immediate	  consequences.	  	  9.	  	  I	  generally	  ignore	  warnings	  about	  possible	  future	  problems	  because	  I	  think	  the	  problems	  will	  be	  resolved	  before	  they	  reach	  crisis	  level.	  	  10.	  	  I	  think	  that	  sacrificing	  now	  is	  usually	  unnecessary	  since	  future	  outcomes	  can	  be	  dealt	  with	  at	  a	  later	  time.	  	  11.	  	  I	  only	  act	  to	  satisfy	  immediate	  concerns,	  figuring	  that	  I	  will	  take	  care	  of	  future	  problems	  that	  may	  occur	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  	  12.	  	  Since	  my	  day	  to	  day	  work	  has	  specific	  outcomes,	  it	  is	  more	  important	  to	  me	  than	  behavior	  that	  has	  distant	  outcomes.	  	  	  
Superstitious Thinking Scale 
Superstitious Thinking: 1.	  	  I	  have	  found	  that	  talking	  about	  successes	  that	  I	  am	  looking	  forward	  to	  can	  keep	  them	  from	  happening.	  	  2.	  	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  in	  any	  superstitions.	  	  3.	  	  When	  something	  good	  happens	  to	  me,	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  balanced	  by	  something	  bad.	  	  
 Concept	  of	  Luck:	  1.	  I	  have	  personal	  possessions	  that	  bring	  me	  luck	  at	  times.	  	  2.	  	  The	  number	  13	  is	  unlucky.	  	  3.	  It	  is	  bad	  luck	  to	  have	  a	  black	  cat	  cross	  your	  path.	  	  4.	  	  Opening	  an	  umbrella	  indoors	  will	  increase	  one's	  chances	  of	  misfortune	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  	  Paranormal:	  1.	  It	  is	  advisable	  to	  consult	  your	  horoscope	  daily.	  	  2.	  Astrology	  can	  be	  useful	  in	  making	  personality	  judgments.	  	  	  ESP:	  1.	  	  Some	  people	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  predict	  the	  future.	  	  2.	  	  Mind	  reading	  is	  not	  possible.	  	  3.	  	  Dreams	  can	  provide	  information	  about	  the	  future.	  	  4.	  	  A	  person's	  thoughts	  can	  influence	  the	  movement	  of	  a	  physical	  object.	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Appendix B Supplemental Results 
 
Table 1.  
The Number of Times and Proportion of Participants Who Preferred the Larger, Delayed 
Reward in the Staircase Task, which Included 25 items that Offered Participants the Choice 
Between $2000 in 1 year or a Smaller Reward Now.  
 
Score n Percentage of N (%) 
0 1 .6 
4 1 .6 
5 1 .6 
6 2 1.2 
7 1 .6 
8 2 1.2 
9 1 .6 
10 2 1.2 
11 20 11.9 
12 10 6.0 
13 5 3.0 
14 6 3.6 
15 16 9.5 
16 12 7.1 
17 15 8.9 
18 22 13.1 
19 7 4.2 
20 9 5.4 
21 23 13.7 
22 2 1.2 
23 10 6.0 
Note: Lower Scores Represent Less Waiting and A Greater Frequency of Choosing A Smaller, 
Immediate Reward over $2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  87	  
 
Table 2.  
The Number of Times and Proportion of Participants Who Preferred the Larger, Delayed 
Reward in the Mixed task.  
TD MIXED: LOW RETURN 
Score n Percentage of N (%) 
0 119 70.8 
1 8 4.8 
2 7 4.2 
3 5 3.0 
4 5 3.6 
5 6 2.4 
6 4 1.2 
7 2 1.8 
8 3 5.4 
9 9 100.0 
 
TD MIXED: MEDIUM RETURN 
Score n Percentage of N (%) 
0 36 21.4 
1 20 11.9 
2 24 14.3 
3 17 10.1 
4 15 8.9 
5 13 7.7 
6 8 4.8 
7 7 4.2 
8 7 4.2 
9 21 12.5 
 
TD MIXED: HIGH RETURN 
Score n Percentage of N (%) 
0 3 1.8 
1 4 2.4 
2 1 .6 
3 6 3.6 
4 5 3.0 
5 8 4.8 
6 17 10.1 
7 15 8.9 
8 31 18.5 
9 78 46.4 
Note: Lower Scores Represent Less Waiting and a Greater Frequency of Choosing the Smaller, 
Immediate Reward. 
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Table 3.  
Correlations between Thinking Disposition Measures and Intellectual Ability  
 
 NFC AOT CFC MRM ST Verbal 
Ability 
Non-
Verbal 
Ability 
Intellectual 
Ability  
Need for Cognition 
(NFC) 
1.00        
Actively Open-
Minded Thinking 
(AOT) 
.39** 1.00       
Consideration of 
Future 
Consequences 
(CFC) 
.52** .44** 1.00      
Master Rationality 
Motive (MRM) 
.41** .41** .59** 1.00     
Superstitious 
Thinking (ST) 
-.27** -.49** -.31** -.34** 1.00    
Verbal Ability .18* .33** .20** .24** -.34** 1.00   
Non Verbal Ability .14 .40** .23** .24** -.44** .33** 1.00  
Cognitive Ability 
Composite 
.20* .45** .27** .30** -.48** .82** .82** 1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
